Congressional Use of Immunity Grants after Iran-Contra by Wright, Ronald F.




Congressional Use of Immunity Grants after Iran-
Contra
Ronald F. Wright
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wright, Ronald F., "Congressional Use of Immunity Grants after Iran-Contra" (1995). Minnesota Law Review. 2273.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2273





I. Counting the Costs of Immunity Grants ........... 413
A. The Statute ................................... 413
B. Judicial Interpretation of the 1970 Inununity
Statute ........................................ 418
1. Type of Hearing and Standard of Proof ..... 419
2. "Indirect" Uses by Prosecutors .............. 421
3. "Indirect" Uses by Prosecution Witnesses:
The North and Poindexter Decisions ........ 423
C. Congressional Practices Before and After North
and Poindexter ................................ 429
D. The Hidden Costs of Current Practices ........ 435
II. Reducing the Costs of Immunity Grants ........... 438
A. Substantive Amendments to the Immunity
Statute ........................................ 438
1. Amend the Definition of Prohibited "Uses".. 439
a. The Attenuation Doctrine ............... 441
b. Private Action .......................... 443
2. Amend the Method for Proving Lack of
Taint ....................................... 44 5
3. All Immunities or Only Congressional
Immunities? ........ ........................ 448
B. Reliance on Executive Sessions ................ 449
C. More Effective Investigations .................. 451
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. I would like to thank Hal
Bruff, Neal Devins, and the members of the ABA Committee on Congressional
Processes for asking me to undertake this project and for offering guidance on a
discussion draft of the paper. Scott Segal obtained invaluable background in-
formation through interviews of congressional staff members; Edgar Brown
gathered together Department of Justice statistics on immunities. John O'Tuel
and Roger Abramson provided able research assistance. My thanks also go to
Akhil Amar, Michael Curtis, Michael Davidson, Morgan Frankel, Michael
Gerhardt, Katy Harriger, Margaret Taylor and Ron Weich for giving their usual
sound advice after reading an earlier draft.
407
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
D. Delayed Investigations ........................ 452
Ill. Deliberating the Costs of Immunity Grants ........ 453
A. Substantive Criteria ........................... 453
B. Request Mechanisms .......................... 457
IV. The Political Context of Congressional Immunity
Grants ............................................ 459
Conclusion: A Note on the Value of Congressional
H earings ................................................ 464
INTRODUCTION
Republicans in Congress once seemed eager to investigate
all the dark corners of the Whitewater affair.1 But after the No-
vember 1994 elections, Whitewater hearings began only after
months of delay.2 Once they started, the investigations pro-
ceeded slowly and only covered well-worn terrain. What ex-
plains this outbreak of caution and deliberation among the new
majority party?
Part of the answer lies in the parallel Whitewater investiga-
tion of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. Starr asked con-
gressional investigators to delay their hearings until he
completed his work on the relevant events. Key Republican
members of Congress, including Senator Alfonse D'Amato, chair
of the Senate Special Committee on Whitewater, and Represen-
tative Jim Leach, chair of the House Banking and Financial
Services Committee, went along with the request. They told the
press that they did not want to interfere with Starr's
investigation.3
Starr most hoped to avoid a congressional grant of immu-
nity to witnesses. If Congress were to force witnesses to testify
by granting them immunity from any prosecution based on that
testimony, a later criminal prosecution of the immunized wit-
nesses by Starr's office would be quite difficult. This is particu-
larly true in light of two decisions by the Court of Appeals for the
1. See Andrew Taylor, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 52 CONG. Q.
WiLY. Rpr. 3277, 3277 (1994) (describing the wish of Republican Congressional
leaders to hold Whitewater hearings).
2. The hearings began on July 18, 1995, in the Senate, and on August 8,
1995, in the House. See Andrew Taylor & David Masci, House Panel Wraps Up
Hearings, 53 CONG. Q. WKLy. Rpr. 2420, 2420 (1995) (reporting on the House
hearings); Gary Warner, Whitewater Hearings Pose Risks for Republicans,
Democrats, 53 CONG. Q. WELY. RPT. 2145, 2145 (1995) (reporting on the Senate
hearings).
3. Stephen Labaton, D'Amato Bows to Prosecutor, Delaying Whitewater
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at B8.
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D.C. Circuit that grew out of the prosecutions of Oliver North
and John Poindexter for their conduct in the Iran-Contra affair.
Those cases made it more difficult than ever for the government
to prove that its prosecution did not rely on a defendant's com-
pelled congressional testimony.4 These judicial interpretations
of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause and of fed-
eral immunity statutes have not only hampered criminal inves-
tigations, but have hobbled full democratic debate in the
political arena.
The possible damage from congressional immunity grants
was not the only reason D'Amato and Leach delayed the White-
water hearings. After all, both had promised throughout 1994
that the investigating committees would not grant any wit-
nesses immunity.5 Yet Starr and his predecessor, Robert Fiske,
insisted all along that the hearings would interfere with the
criminal investigation, even if Congress granted no immunities
at all.6
Starr and Fiske feared that congressional investigators
might contact witnesses before their own investigators could fin-
ish collecting evidence. 7 The Whitewater prosecutors worried
4. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,851 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), mod-
ified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941
(1991); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
5. See generally Andrew Taylor, New Revelations on Whitewater Revive
GOP Call for Hearings, 52 CONG. Q. WKiy. R-r. 585 (1994) (detailing Special
Counsel Robert Fiske's appeals to Congress to delay hearings). In March 1994,
Senator D'Amato and other Republican members of Congress criticized the
Democrats for refusing to vigorously investigate the Whitewater affair. They
argued that any potential interference with the special prosecutor could be rem-
edied by avoiding grants of immunity to witnesses and by allowing then-prose-
cutor Robert Fiske to interview witnesses prior to their appearance before
Congress. See Michael Ross, Senate OKs Whitewater Resolution, LA. Timss,
Mar. 18, 1994, at A17 (reporting Senate compromise on timing of hearings);
Whitewater Counsel Urges Hearing Delay, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRm., Mar. 10,
1994, at Al (describing Special Counsel's opposition to hearings); Charles V.
Zehren, Fiske to Congress: Put Off Hearings, NEWSDAY, Mar. 8, 1994, at 15 (de-
tailing Fiske's efforts to delay congressional hearings).
6. Charles J. Lewis, Congressional Hearings on RTC May Be Delayed;
Fiske Is Offered Time to Interview Witnesses, NEw ORLEANS TrMEs-PIcAYuNE,
Mar. 12, 1994, at A4.
7. See, e.g., Helen Dewar & Ann Devroy, Fiske, Hill Negotiate on Hear-
ings, WASH. PosT, Mar. 10, 1994, at Al (detailing Fiske's concerns with the
timing of congressional hearings). A letter from Fiske to the Senate and House
Banking Committees, dated March 7, 1994, stated:
[Sluch interviews (congressional interviews of witnesses] could jeop-
ardize our investigation in several respects, including the dangers of
Congressional immunity, the premature disclosures of the contents of
documents or of witnesses' testimony to other witnesses on the same
409
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that if congressional investigators contacted witnesses and re-
leased any information about their conversations, this would al-
low other witnesses to revise their own testimony in light of the
new information. Such congressional contacts could also affect
the way that the contacted witnesses themselves remembered
the key events.
The prosecutors' request that Congress avoid any contact at
all with potential witnesses - and not just refrain from grant-
ing immunities - demonstrates the breadth of the possible con-
flict between the two parallel investigations. The willingness of
Congress to honor these requests in the Whitewater context is
an extraordinary statement about Congress's view of the rela-
tive importance of criminal and congressional inquiries.
Even accounting for the full range of conflicts between crim-
inal and congressional investigators, relations between the two
groups of investigators do not fully explain the course and tim-
ing of the Whitewater hearings. The law of immunity grants,
and the broader aims of criminal investigators, are only two of
the elements in the political calculus at work here. Democrats
watching these events have pointed out that by delaying a full
congressional investigation several months to accommodate the
Independent Counsel, the Republican committee chairs pushed
their public hearings further into the 1996 presidential cam-
paign season.8 And Republicans outside the banking commit-
tees noted that abbreviated initial hearings on Whitewater did
little to attract popular attention. The Republican leadership
insisted that any Whitewater hearings would have to await ac-
tion on the higher legislative priorities contained in the Contract
with America.
I hope in this Article to sort out how the law of immunity
combines with political forces to shape congressional investiga-
tions of the executive branch that take place at the same time as
criminal investigations. While the Whitewater matter provides
a recent example of this dynamic at work, it is by no means
subject (creating the risk of tailored testimony) and of premature pub-
lic disclosure of matters at the core of the criminal investigation.
Letter from Robert B. Fiske to Democratic and Republican Leaders of the
House and Senate Banking Committees (Mar. 7, 1994) in 52 CONG. Q. WRLY.
RPT. 627, 627 (1994) [hereinafter Fiske Letter].
8. See Weston Kosova, Whitewater Again, NEw REPUBLIC, May 29, 1995,
at 12 (detailing political considerations involved in the timing and reach of the
Whitewater investigation).
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unique.9 I begin in Part I with a description of the costs that
now attach to congressional grants of immunity. In Part II, I
suggest steps Congress might take to reduce those costs, but
conclude that none of these are likely to succeed.
In Part III, I abandon the idea that Congress can avoid con-
flicts between parallel prosecutorial and congressional investi-
gations. Recognizing that congressional investigations will
sometimes be inconvenient and costly for prosecutors, I propose
several ways to help Congress decide more carefully when to go
forward despite the risks. I conclude that Congress can take
steps to improve procedures for considering possible immunity
grants, even though such procedural changes are unlikely to
produce consistent and satisfactory deliberation in Congress.
Part IV of the Article places Congress's immunity practices in
the larger political context of investigations of the executive
branch. I lay out some of the inconveniences that congressional
investigations might create for prosecutors even if those con-
gressional bodies never grant immunity to witnesses. Then I de-
scribe the political circumstances that make these
inconveniences valuable to some members of Congress, and give
them (at least sometimes) a viable reason to delay or avoid a full
investigation.
These questions will remain relevant long after the White-
water affair fades from memory. Whenever there is reason to
suspect wrongdoing by a high-ranking federal official, there is a
good chance that both Congress and criminal prosecutors will
want to investigate. 10 Because of the consequences of congres-
sional immunity grants, there is also a good chance that the con-
gressional investigation will interfere with the criminal
investigation. Recognizing such potential conflicts, criminal
prosecutors have time and again requested that Congress post-
pone or modify its investigation of highly visible incidents.1
9. See, e.g., David Johnston, Sharpshooter Refuses To Testify to a Senate
Panel, N.Y. Timss, Sept. 13, 1995, at A13 (describing hearings on FBI shooting
incident at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, where an FBI sharpshooter invoked his constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination in the absence of a congressional grant of
immunity).
10. The number of congressional investigations is much higher now than it
was earlier in this century. JAMEs HAMITON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STuDY
OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 209 (1976).
11. Whitewater prosecutors are not the only ones to make such requests
recently. See United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam), modifying United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). See also JEFFREY TooBIN, OPENING ARGUMNTs 51-62
(1991) (discussing immunity issues that arose during the Iran-Contra affair).
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Whitewater is not unique in the way that congressional in-
vestigators have deferred to criminal investigators. From a
broader perspective, this tells us something about the relative
value in our political culture of congressional hearings and crim-
inal prosecution. The eventual failures of the North and
Poindexter prosecutions have forced Congress to choose between
holding executive branch officials accountable during congres-
sional hearings or during criminal proceedings. Congress's cur-
rent reluctance to grant immunity suggests that we will too
often choose the latter.
Giving priority to the criminal proceedings reflects our mis-
placed faith in the power of the criminal law to vindicate all pub-
lic morality and to stop all wrongdoing. Further, it reinforces
cynicism about legislators to say that congressional investiga-
tions are only for show, and that good citizens should not be dis-
tracted by what happens in that circus atmosphere. Thus, this
essay about a narrow investigative technique - grants of im-
munity - is also a plea to think of congressional hearings as a
meaningful forum both for discussing public values and for en-
couraging lawful and ethical conduct by public officials.
Arlin Adams, Independent Counsel for the HUD scandal, indicated that the
two investigations of that matter could run side by side as long as no immuni-
ties were given. Congressman Christopher Shays, Inaction by Ethics Commit-
tee, Congressional Press Releases, July 29, 1994. Interim U.S. Attorney J.
Ramsey Johnson, investigating the House Post Office Scandal, also requested
that Congress keep investigative documents secret in order to preserve his in-
vestigation. Armed with a letter from Johnson urging that the documents and
transcripts be withheld, Democrats charged that Republicans were out to "rev
up" the talk shows and score political points, even if it meant "blowing the
case." Eric Pianin, House Votes to Keep Post Office Documents Secret; Demo-
crats Claim Release Would Jeopardize Federal Prosecution; GOP Charges
Coverup, WASH. PosT, July 23, 1993, at A16.
The same types of requests will surely come from the independent counsels
investigating Mike Espy, Henry Cisneros, and Ron Brown should Congress
show an interest in conducting its own investigations of their matters. On Sep-
tember 9, 1994, Donald Smaltz was named as independent counsel to investi-
gate whether Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy accepted gifts from companies
regulated by his department. Pierre Thomas & Howard Schneider, Los Angeles
Attorney Chosen To Head Investigation of Espy, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1994, at
A3. David Barrett was named on May 24, 1995, as independent counsel to in-
vestigate whether HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros broke the law when he lied
to the FBI about payments to a former mistress. Michael Hedges, Lawyer Ac-
tive in GOP to Head Cisneros Probe, WASH. TIMEs, May 25, 1995, at Al. The
conflict between congressional and prosecutorial investigators can also arise in
less visible settings, such as investigations of defense procurement.
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I. COUNTING THE COSTS OF IMMUNITY GRANTS
A. THE STATUTE
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."12 The government cannot compel a
witness in a non-criminal proceeding, such as a civil trial or con-
gressional hearing, to provide evidence that would tend to ex-
pose the witness to later criminal charges. 13 Therefore, if
Congress wants to obtain incriminating testimony from a wit-
ness, it must promise that no government agent will use that
congressional testimony to further a later criminal prosecution
against the witness.' 4 This promise is known as "immunity."
Between 1892 and 1970, all the federal immunity statutes
in active use conferred "transactional immunity" on witnesses. 15
The statutes provided that the government would not prosecute
a witness for any crimes arising out of any "transaction" de-
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The privilege af-
forded not only extends to answers that would support a conviction under a
federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those that would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.");
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) ("[O]bject was to insure that
a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investiga-
tion, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed
a crime.").
14. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896). The promise must extend both to federal and state
prosecutions. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964); Adams
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954).
15. The first federal immunity statute, passed in 1857, conferred "transac-
tional" immunity on witnesses compelled to testify. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19,
11 Stat. 155 (1857). An 1862 amendment to the statute provided more limited
"simple use" immunity, which prevented the use of testimony, but not prosecu-
tion of the witness. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862). The
Supreme Court overturned one such "simple use" immunity statute in Coun-
selman because the statute allowed "indirect" use of investigative leads from
the testimony, such as using the compelled testimony to identify new witnesses
or other sources of evidence. 142 U.S. at 586. The Court upheld the use of
"transactional" immunity in Brown. 161 U.S. at 610. Nonetheless, the portion
of the 1862 statute applying to witnesses appearing before Congress remained
unamended (and thus was not used) until 1954, when a revised statute pro-
vided "transactional" immunity for witnesses compelled to testify before Con-
gress. Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745 (1954) ("[Clommittee shall
[authorize] such witness to be granted immunity ... with respect to the trans-
actions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled.., to testify.").
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws compiled a
list of state and federal immunity statutes. 2 WORKING PAPERS 1444-45 (1970);
see also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 425-26, 428 (1943) (listing sev-
eral administrative immunity statutes).
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scribed in the testimony. For instance, one federal statute pre-
vented criminal prosecution for "any transaction, matter or
thing, concerning which [the witness] may testify." 16
Even after a grant of transactional immunity, prosecutors
could pursue criminal charges in limited circumstances. The
government could still prosecute for perjury or false statements
any witness who deliberately lied during the immunized testi-
mony or during later testimony.17 Moreover, the Fifth Amend-
ment protects only against the use of compelled testimony for
criminal sanctions: the government could therefore use the com-
pelled testimony against the witness in later civil or administra-
tive proceedings.18 Despite these exceptions, many viewed
transactional immunity as overly generous to witnesses because
it allowed witnesses to take an "immunity bath" by testifying
about as many criminal transactions as possible when called to
16. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443-44 (1893), repealed by Organ-
ized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
17. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980) (Fifth Amend-
ment allows a witness to remain silent, but not to swear falsely); United States
v. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d 1216, 1221 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 192 (1994). See
Russell J. Davis, Annotation, What Constitutes a 'False Statement" Within Ex-
ception to Federal Use Immunity Statute, 28 A.L.R. FED. 938 (1976) (analyzing
federal cases which determined what constitutes a "false statement" under the
exception to immunity contained in the Federal Use Immunity Statute of 1970).
18. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) (The extent to which
the witness is compelled to answer such questions as do not fix upon him a
criminal culpability is within the control of the legislature."); see also Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) ("[]mmunity granted need only
remove those sanctions which generated the fear justifying invocation of the
privilege."); Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Use in Disbarment Proceeding of Testi-
mony Given by Attorney in Criminal Proceeding Under Grant of Immunity, 62
A.L.R. 3D 1145 (1975) (discussing cases which examine whether an attorney's
testimony in a criminal proceeding under a grant of immunity may be subse-
quently used against the same attorney in a disbarment proceeding).
Immunity would not attach to self-incriminating statements not made in
response to a question, nor to crimes not substantially related to the transac-
tion covered during the testimony. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investi-
gation, 406 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1972); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 143-
44 (1913); see Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Per-
sons, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 189, 253-60 (1967) (discussing investigations involving
the Fifth Amendment).
Most states allow non-criminal uses of a witness's compelled testimony. 2
SARA SUN BEALE & WILinm C. BRYsON, GRAND JuRY LAw AND PRACTICE § 9.13
(1987). In addition, two federal circuits permit immunized testimony at the sen-
tencing hearing once a witness has been convicted of an offense. United States
v. Crisp, 817 F.2d 256, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1987) (immunized testimony at sentenc-
ing permitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987); United States v. Fulbright,
804 F.2d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); contra United States v. Abanatha, 999
F.2d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1993) (immunized testimony at sentencing
prohibited).
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testify. 19 Transactional immunity made compelled witnesses
better off than they would have been if they had remained silent.
As part of the Crime Control Act of 1970, Congress rewrote
all federal immunity statutes to provide a narrower form of im-
munity, known as "use immunity."20 Use immunity makes a
less ambitious promise to the witness. It promises only that the
government will not use the compelled testimony directly as evi-
dence, and will not use it indirectly as an investigative lead to
obtain evidence for a criminal case.21 The government can still
prosecute an immunized witness for the crime he or she testifies
about, so long as the prosecution can prove that it did not make
such direct or indirect use of the compelled testimony.22
The power of Congress to compel testimony has always been
governed by statutes separate from those dealing with testi-
mony before grand juries, administrative agencies, or trials.
The 1862 statute that specifically gave Congress power to grant
immunity to witnesses provided only for use immunity.23 In
1892, however, the Supreme Court overturned another federal
statute that conferred use immunity on witnesses compelled to
testify before grand juries, holding that the Fifth Amendment
required the more generous transactional immunity as a consti-
19. ALAN BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION 130-34 (1955). See CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 428-31 (1862) (discussing immunity for wit-
nesses before congressional committees).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994). The Court in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comnm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964), raised the possibility that a use immunity stat-
ute could survive a Fifth Amendment challenge. The Court suggested that a
state immunity statute would provide sufficient protection for compelled wit-
nesses if a court-created exclusionary rule prevented use of the testimony or
any of its fruits in a subsequent federal prosecution of the witness. Id.
21. "[No testimony or other information compelled under the [court] order
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order." 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Some argue that the statute also prevents
the prosecution from using the compelled testimony indirectly in any way that
could strengthen the government's case, even if the indirect use does not lead to
new evidence. See infra notes 59-63 (describing some courts' per se rule against
the prosecution's use of compelled testimony).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 740-42 (11th Cir. 1993)
(denying compelled self-incrimination claim when testimony established that
evidence was derived from independent sources), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 56
(1994); United States v. Dynalectric Co., 859 F.2d 1559, 1578-80 (11th Cir.
1988) ("Paxson's self-serving testimony provided no direct or investigatory
leads for which the government did not have a legitimate independent source."),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
23. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862) (providing immunity for
witnesses testifying before Congress).
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tutional minimum. 24 Congress did not amend the statute to al-
low for transactional immunity until 1954 for congressional
witnesses. Senator Joseph McCarthy and other members of
Congress investigating "un-American activities" hoped to com-
pel the testimony of many witnesses who had invoked the Fifth
Amendment, and needed to create a statutory basis for doing
so. 25 Thus, from 1892 until 1954, Congress had no effective
power to compel testimony if a witness claimed the self-incrimi-
nation privilege.26
The 1954 immunity statute for congressional witnesses did
not empower individual members of Congress to obtain a com-
pulsion order. Instead, the request had to come from two-thirds
of the members of a full committee,27 or from the majority of the
members present in either the House or the Senate as a whole. 28
Congress provided for the two-thirds requirement 29 because
some members were concerned about single-member subcom-
mittees (consisting of individual Senators or Representatives)
holding hearings to expose Communists in important American
institutions.30 Congress as a whole was unwilling to give immu-
nity power to the individual members who were responsible for
these abusive proceedings. 31
The 1970 version of the congressional immunity statute, 18
U.S.C. § 6005, retains the two-thirds voting requirement of the
24. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See supra note 15
(describing Counselman).
25. Act of Aug. 20, 1954, Pub. L. No. 600, 68 Stat. 745 (1954) (providing forimmunity of witnesses before Congress); see 99 CONG. REC. 6, 8340-57 (1953)
(discussing immunity bill in the Senate).
26. See ERNEST J. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 336-39
(1928) (reviewing attempts to reenact the statute of 1857); TELFORD TAYLOR,
GRAND INQuEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 216-21, 296-
300 (1955) (examining the 1862 and 1954 immunity statutes).
27. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 218. The earliest Congresses were reluctant
to give any investigative power at all to full committees. It was not until 1827
in the House, and 1859 in the Senate, that committees had the power to compel
testimony at all, putting aside any questions of Fifth Amendment privileges.
M. Nelson McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18
U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426-27 (1951).
28. Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1576 n.41 (1963).
29. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 218.
30. Comment, supra note 28, at 1576-78. For an account of one such sin-
gle-member subcommittee hearing convened by Senator Eastland, see BARTH,
supra note 19, at 83-90.
31. See CONG. REc. supra note 25 (discussing Senate debate on the immu-
nity bill); Rufus King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40
ABA J. 377-81 (1954) (examining the problems that expanding immunity pow-
ers creates).
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1954 statute.32 The 1970 statute requires a full committee, or
the House or Senate as a whole, to seek an order from a district
court judge compelling the testimony of the witness. 33 Before
issuing the order, the district court must confirm that an appro-
priate legislative body authorized the request and that the re-
questing body has given the Department of Justice at least ten
days' notice of the proposed immunity grant.3 4 The Attorney
General can request an additional twenty days to review the re-
quest before the judge may issue the order.35
Such an order compels the witness to provide testimony or
other information that the witness has previously refused to pro-
vide on the basis of the Fifth Amendment privilege.3 6 In ex-
change, the witness receives use immunity: "no testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other infor-
mation) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case."
3 7
32. 18 U.S.C. § 6005.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b), (c). The legislative history of the 1970 statute does
not elaborate on the drafters' reasons for readopting the 1954 authorization
procedure. The limited discussion devoted to the immunity statute, part of a
much larger crime bill, deals exclusively with the issue of use immunity versus
transactional immunity.
Section 6005 originated in the Second Interim Report of the National Com-
mission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, dated March 17, 1969. WoRK-
ING PAPERS, supra note 15, at 1405-06; see 115 CONG. REC. 10041-10043 (1969)
(statement of President Nixon on organized crime). The Commission's proposal
was embodied in two bills introduced in 1969, H.R. 1157, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), and S. 2122,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Senate bill was ultimately
included in the 1970 Act. See 116 CONG. REc. 577-78 (1970) (detailing the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act).
36. "[Ihe witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination." 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
37. Id. The statute, like its predecessors, still allows use of the immunized
testimony in prosecutions for perjury or for giving a false statement. BEALE &
BRYSON, supra note 18, § 9.14.
The committee reports on these bills, and the testimony at public hearings
on the immunity question, dealt exclusively with the constitutionality of useimmunity. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1188,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
Supreme Court dicta in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964),
had suggested that use immunity would, contrary to Counselman, be acceptable
under the Fifth Amendment. See supra notes 15 (describing Counselman) and
20 (describing Murphy).
Although the federal system now employs use immunity, several states still
provide the more generous transactional immunity to witnesses compelled to
testify before a state legislative body. Most state statutes do not mention spe-
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In sum, the 1970 statute made two significant changes in
immunity practices. The new statute established a uniform
procedure for obtaining immunity orders for all compelled testi-
mony in the federal system, replacing the variety of statutes and
procedures that applied to congressional, grand jury, adminis-
trative, and trial testimony. The statute also attempted to au-
thorize some later prosecutions of immunized witnesses where
none had been possible before.
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1970 vIuNrrY STATUTE
The Supreme Court considered a challenge to the 1970 fed-
eral immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States.38 The Court
decided that the use immunity offered under the statute is "co-
extensive" with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination because use immunity leaves the witness in
substantially the same position as if he or she had claimed the
privilege and remained silent.39 Transactional immunity, the
Court said, offered broader protection than the Fifth Amend-
ment requires.40
cial procedures for legislative grants of immunity; the state legislature simply
follows the immunity procedure available to criminal prosecutors in the state.
BF4,E & BRYsoN, supra, § 9.08. But among those states with a special statute
for legislative grants of immunity, transactional immunity is most common.
The states granting transactional immunity to legislative witnesses include the
following: ALAsKA STAT. § 24.25.070 (1992); CAL. GOVT CODE § 9410 (West
1992); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 3, § 28 (Law. Co-op. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
25 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-5-105 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-3-119
(1994); TEx. GOVT CODE ANN. § 301.025 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 4-1-5a
(1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.35 (West 1986). The states granting use immunity
to legislative witnesses include the following: Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1152
(1992); IDAHO CODE § 67-411 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 25, para. 5/6 (Smith-
Hurd 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2011.02 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13-3
(West 1986); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 101.44 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 411 (West 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 171.525 (1991). Hawaii gives the
legislature a choice between transactional and use immunity. HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 621C-1-5 (1985). South Carolina has separate statutes for different commit-
tees of the legislature. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-60, 2-29-10, 2-31-30, 8-13-540
(Law. Co-op. 1994). Only transactional immunity, however, satisfies the South
Carolina Constitution- State v. Thrift, 440 S.E.2d 341, 351-352 (S.C. 1994).
Rhode Island only allows immunity for legislative witnesses when testifying in
impeachment proceedings. R.I. GN. LAws, § 22-6-2.2 (1994).
38. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The government had subpoenaed the witnesses in
Kastigar to testify before a federal grand jury in California. Id- at 442. The
witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination
and refused to testify even after the judge supervising the grand jury ordered
them, under the new immunity statute, to testify. Id.
39. Id. at 453.
40. Id. at 458 (citing Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79).
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According to Kastigar, the government can prosecute an im-
munized witness if prosecutors can satisfy the trial court, during
a pre-trial hearing, that the prosecution derived all of its
proposed evidence from independent sources.41 The prosecution
has to prove that it made no direct or indirect use of the
testimony to make the case against the witness.42 Direct use
means introduction of the compelled testimony into evidence. 43
The bar on indirect (or derivative) use means, at a minimum,
that the government may not use the compelled testimony
to impeach the witness's testimony" or to develop new evi-
dence.45 The prosecutor bears a "heavy burden" in making this
showing.46
Federal courts interpreting the immunity statute after Kas-
tigar have found this basic guidance from the Supreme Court
insufficient to resolve many of the disputes that have erupted
under the statute.47 For its part, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia significantly increased the burdens on pros-
ecutors in its decisions in the Oliver North and John Poindexter
Iran-Contra prosecutions. 48 Because the D.C. Circuit is the ap-
peals court most likely to hear challenges to prosecutions in the
wake of congressional grants of immunity, 49 these decisions are
likely to inform all future congressional immunity grants.
1. Type of Hearing and Standard of Proof
The prosecution, under the immunity statute and the
Supreme Court's Kastigar opinion, must prove that it has made
no direct or indirect use of immunized testimony. Neither the
statute nor Kastigar, however, addresses the type of hearing the
41. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
42. Id. at 460.
43. United States v. Kurzer, 534 F. 2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1976).
44. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979).
45. Kurzer, 534 F.2d at 517.
46. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461.
47. Kate E. Bloch, Police Officers Accused of Crime: Prosecutorial and Fifth
Amendment Risks Posed by Polce-Elicited "Use Immunized" Statements, 1992
U. ILL. L. Rlv. 625, 640-53 (1992) (discussing the prosecutor's burden in Kasti-
gar hearings).
48. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (detailing the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinions in the North and Poindexter cases).
49. The D.C. Circuit is most likely to hear any disputes surrounding con-
gressional grants of immunity because most of the executive branch officials
testifying before Congress (at least those witnesses valuable enough to merit
immunity) will live and work in Washington. Thus, the federal courts in that
district will have venue over most of the subsequent criminal trials that will
raise questions about the use of immunized testimony.
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court must hold to determine this issue or the exact standard of
proof the prosecution must meet.
Federal courts have reached different conclusions about the
type of hearing necessary. Some courts, including the D.C. Cir-
cuit, have required testimonial presentation of the evidence in
an adversarial hearing.50 Other federal courts have allowed the
prosecution to demonstrate the independence of its evidence
through less formal methods, such as the use of affidavits. 51
Even when the court allows less formal methods, the prosecu-
tion must do more than submit affidavits or testimony of inves-
tigators or prosecutors denying any use of the tainted
testimony.52 It must also make an affirmative showing that it
derived all the evidence from independent sources. 53
Lower federal courts have also disagreed about the stan-
dard of proof the government must meet. The Court in Kastigar
stated that the prosecution's burden is "heavy," but did not spec-
ify any of the traditional standards of proof.54 Most lower fed-
eral courts (including the D.C. Circuit) have used a
preponderance of the evidence standard,55 but a few have re-
quired clear and convincing evidence.56 Some federal courts al-
50. United States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 501 U.S. 1230 (1991); United States v. Rinaldi, 808 F.2d 1579, 1583-85
(D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 734 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. De Diego, 511 F.2d 818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see United States
v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 664 (8th Cir. 1986) (using supervisory power to re-
quire district courts to hold evidentiary hearings when the grand jury hearing
compelled testimony also indicts the witness).
51. United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1006
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Romano, 583
F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1978).
52. United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 225 (6th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985).
53. United States v. Brimberry, 803 F.2d 908, 915-17 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); United States v. Tantalo, 680 F.2d 903, 908 (2d
Cir. 1982); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1006 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Gerace, 576 F. Supp. 1185, 1187-91 (D.N.J. 1983).
54. 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
55. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854, 872 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2234 (1991); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1518 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529
(11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 722 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1984); United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 1978); United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
56. United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418, 1422 (D.N.J. 1984); United
States v. Hossbach, 518 F. Supp. 759, 772 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v.
[Vol. 80:407420
19953 CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 421
low prosecutors to demonstrate that any improper use of
compelled testimony was harmless error.57
2. "Indirect" Uses by Prosecutors
The federal courts have also reached different conclusions
about what constitutes a prohibited "use" of "information di-
rectly or indirectly derived" from immunized testimony within
the meaning of the statute. 58 A few courts have stated that the
government can make no use whatsoever of immunized testi-
mony against the witness, whether during the investigation,
charging, plea bargaining, or trial of the case.5 9 These courts
emphasize language from the Kastigar opinion suggesting that
the statute establishes a "total" or "sweeping" prohibition on
"any use" of the compelled testimony "in any respect."6 0
According to this group of courts, even if the prosecutor's
exposure to the compelled testimony does not lead to the intro-
duction of any new evidence, such exposure could motivate the
prosecutor to pursue lines of questioning more persistently, or to
frame questions or statements more effectively at trial.61 The
testimony might also convince a prosecutor to renew efforts to
win over a previously identified (but reluctant) prosecution wit-
ness.62 These tactical advantages for the prosecution reportedly
are functionally equivalent to obtaining new evidence. 63
Rice, 421 F. Supp. 871, 877 (E.D. Ill. 1976); see also United States v. Semkiw,
712 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1983) ("high standard").
57. United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1989); United States
v. Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078, 1083 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089 (1989).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
59. United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Barker, 542 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 588 F.2d 899 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 460 (1972).
61. United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting
McDaniel, 482 F.2d at 311, and finding the government successfully showed
that it did not use compelled testimony in "focusing the investigation, deciding
to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, planning
cross-examination, or otherwise generally planning trial strategy").
62. United States v. Rivera, 23 C.MA. 430, 50 C.M.R. 389, 392 (1975).
63. See Kristine Strachen, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate,
56 TEx. L. Rxv. 791, 808 (1978) (examining nonevidentiary uses of compelled
testimony and endorsing a return to transactional immunity); see also United
States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (concluding that any
prosecutorial exposure to compelled testimony will inevitably lead to tactical
advantages, and thus enforcing a per se ban on prosecutorial exposure to immu-
nized testimony), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 872 (1974); but see Pantone, 634 F.2d at 720 (disallowing "non-eviden-
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A larger group of federal courts have prohibited only "evi-
dentiary" uses of the testimony-that is, uses leading to addi-
tional evidence admissible in a criminal trial against the
witness.64 These courts allow the prosecution to make "non-evi-
dentiary" uses of the testimony. For instance, a prosecutor
might review the immunized testimony to inform a decision
about plea bargaining, or to decide where to devote limited in-
vestigative resources, or to decide on the order of evidence at
trial.65
The prosecution can usually demonstrate that it made no
evidentiary use of tainted testimony by showing the independ-
ent source of each piece of evidence in its case. It can do this
most effectively by keeping careful records of the independent
source leading to each witness, and to each planned line of ques-
tioning on direct and cross-examination. In some circum-
stances, the prosecution may also be able to "can" the
testimony-that is, record the witness's testimony before the de-
fendant receives immunity to testify.6 6
Prosecutors also usually provide a second type of proof.
They try to demonstrate that none of the prosecutors, investiga-
tors, or others on the prosecutorial team were ever exposed to
tainted testimony.67 This sort of proof is especially helpful in
courts that prohibit non-evidentiary uses of testimony, and pro-
vides some helpful "insurance" in those courts barring only evi-
tiary" use but upholding conviction after prosecutorial exposure to immunized
testimony in between first and second trials of defendant).
64. United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Rivieccio, 919 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Serrano,
870 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989); United States v. Crowson, 828
F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1530-31
(11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501, 508-11 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976).
The D.C. Circuit has not ruled directly on the question of non-evidentiary
uses of compelled testimony. Its opinions in the North case, however, suggest
that the D.C. Circuit will ultimately join those federal courts completely bar-
ring non-evidentiary uses. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 856-60
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
65. See Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Be-
yond the Fifth Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REv. 351, 368 (1987) (arguing that the
federal immunity statute and the Fifth Amendment prohibit only evidentiary
uses of compelled testimony).
66. 2 BF.ALE & BRYSON, supra note 18, § 9.19.
67. United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1978); UNITED
STATES ATORNEys' MANuAL, §§ 1-11.400, 9-23.330, 9-23.400 [hereinafter
MANUAL].
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dentiary uses. Courts routinely criticize prosecutors who fail to
take such precautions when they are available. 68
Although it is rare for exposure alone to invalidate an in-
dictment or conviction, 69 exposure to immunized testimony does
make it more important for the prosecution to document the in-
dependent sources for all evidence and trial strategy. Con-
versely, a showing of no exposure may not be enough, standing
alone, to protect an indictment or conviction. The prosecution
must still take care to prove the independent source of the evi-
dence, along with the lack of exposure. 70
The most important factor about each of these indirect
prosecutorial uses of immunized testimony is that the prosecu-
tor retains a great deal of control over the fate of the criminal
case. Even if Congress grants immunity over the prosecutor's
objection, the prosecutor can-with sufficient planning and ex-
pense-insulate the attorneys and investigators from the
tainted testimony, and can maintain careful records about the
independent sources of evidence. This may be an onerous bur-
den, but prosecutors can nevertheless take steps to meet it.
3. "Indirect" Uses by Prosecution Witnesses: The North and
Poindexter Decisions
In addition to such indirect uses of immunized testimony by
prosecutors, a few courts have considered whether exposure of
other witnesses to the immunized testimony of a defendant can
taint the testimony of those other witnesses. Until recently,
courts reviewing this alleged indirect "use" of testimony have
left the prosecutor with some ability to protect his or her case
68. See United States v. Harris, 973 F.2d 333, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (find-
ing the prosecution failed to prove it did not use defendants immunized testi-
mony in obtaining evidence because immunized statements were not insulated
from the prosecution and incriminating documents were not sealed); United
States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990) (recommending the government take precautions such as a "China Wall"
to ensure subsequent proceedings would not be tainted by compelled testi-
mony); United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 18 n.18 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding no
direct or indirect evidentiary use of the testimony notwithstanding the prosecu-
tion's access to televised versions of immunized testimony because the prosecu-
tion succeeded in showing an independent source for evidence); United States v.
Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1532 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating the government need
only show by a preponderance of the evidence that everything used at trial was
derived from a legitimate source).
69. United States v. Harris, 973 F.2d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir. 1980).
70. United States v. Smith, 580 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (D.N.J. 1984).
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from any tainted witnesses. 71 Recent decisions, however, have
reduced the prosecutor's control over the taint of immunized
testimony.
Where other witnesses have been exposed to immunized
testimony, some courts have required the prosecution to show
that the witness would have chosen to testify at trial, even with-
out the exposure to immunized testimony.72 In other words,
these courts inquire into the motives of the witness in choosing
to testify. They have usually not scrutinized the content of wit-
ness testimony for signs of taint from the defendant's immu-
nized testimony.
For instance, in United States v. Brimberry, the defendant
gave immunized grand jury testimony implicating two fellow
employees in a tax fraud.73 The two co-workers then pleaded
guilty and offered evidence in turn against Brimberry.74
Brimberry claimed that the prosecution made an indirect "use"
of his testimony by using it to induce the co-workers to testify
against him.7 5 The prosecution demonstrated, however, that its
case against the co-workers, even without Brimberry's evidence,
was very strong and gave the co-workers enough incentive to
plead guilty and cooperate with the government.76 Hence, the
prosecution could avoid the taint of immunized testimony by en-
suring that it gives all its witnesses adequate incentive to testify
voluntarily. 77
Two recent decisions of the D.C. Circuit, however, have re-
duced the prosecutor's ability to control the tainting of prosecu-
tion witnesses by focusing on the content of a witness's
testimony, rather than his or her motives in testifying. In
71. See G. Robert Blakey, Immunity Can Work If Used with Care, L.A.
TImEs, Dec. 28, 1986, at 5 (asserting that use immunity can be used to deter-
mine the truth in a congressional investigation without jeopardizing subse-
quent criminal prosecutions).
72. United States v. Brimberry, 803 F.2d 908, 915-17 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); United States v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1479, 1489
(11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1976).
The defendant in Brimberry had testified before a grand jury, and before repre-
sentatives of the Securities Exchange Commission. Brimberry, 803 F.2d at 910;
see also United States v. Cavalier 17 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing testi-
mony from a witness who was motivated to testify after hearing about the de-
fendant's compelled testimony implicating him in a separate crime).
73. 803 F.2d at 910-11; but ef Hampton, 775 F.2d at 1489 (requiring in-
quiry into witness's motive to testify and content of witness testimony).
74. Brimberry, 803 F.2d at 910.
75. Id. at 911.
76. Id. at 916-17.
77. See United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1976).
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United States v. North78 and United States v. Poindexter,79 the
court overturned the convictions of Iran-Contra figures Oliver
North and John Poindexter because prosecution witnesses' expo-
sure to North's and Poindexter's immunized testimony before
Congress constituted improper "use."
The Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh, had taken ex-
tensive precautions to prevent any prosecutorial exposure to theimmunized testimony. The prosecutors canceled newspaper
subscriptions and stopped watching broadcast news. Prosecu-
tors also filed with the court "canned" versions of witness inter-
views completed before the congressional testimony, and
memoranda describing the prosecution's investigation and strat-
egy up to that point.8 0 Grand jury proceedings were already un-
derway when both Poindexter and North testified. The
Independent Counsel presented no immunized testimony to the
grand jury, and repeatedly cautioned the grand jurors not to lis-
ten to media accounts of the congressional testimony.81
The difficulty in the case came not in the exposure of prose-
cutors to immunized testimony, but in the exposure of the prose-
cution's grand jury and trial witnesses. Many of the witnesses
closely followed the testimony of Oliver North and John
Poindexter during televised congressional hearings. While some
of those witnesses had given interviews to the FBI or had testi-
fied to the grand jury before the congressional testimony took
place, others had not yet recorded their testimony in any for-
mat.82 The Independent Counsel asked some witnesses not to
expose themselves to the compelled testimony, but most refused.
The Independent Counsel also requested that grand jury and
trial witnesses answer questions based only on their own recol-
lection, and not based on any facts they may have learned from
hearing North or Poindexter testify. The trial court gave the
same instruction to trial witnesses.83
78. 910 F.2d 843, 868 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
79. 951 F.2d 369, 375-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656
(1992).
80. United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 315-16 (D.D.C. 1988).
81. Id. at 309.
82. Id. at 313-14; United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1488, 1499
(D.D.C. 1988).
83. North, 910 F.2d at 916-17. The district court found that the exposure
of witnesses to immunized testimony occurred "in the natural course of events,"
and was not the product of prosecutorial efforts to refresh the recollection of the
witnesses. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. at 313.
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The defendants claimed that this witness exposure to the
immunized testimony influenced the content of the witnesses'
testimony to the grand jury and at trial. The trial judges in both
cases made factual findings that the witnesses all testified
truthfully, and based on their own knowledge only. The trial
judges also reviewed grand jury testimony and FBI interview
notes for trial witnesses before they testified. However, the
judges did not review witnesses' trial testimony line-by-line af-
ter the trial to determine whether any witnesses changed testi-
mony as a result of hearing immunized testimony.84
The D.C. Circuit held, in both cases, that the trial judges
had not taken adequate steps to determine whether exposure to
the defendants' immunized testimony had changed the content
of later witness testimony. The trial court in such a circum-
stance must review the proffered testimony of a witness, line-by-
line, to make the determination. The prosecutor may show that
there was no impermissible use by demonstrating (1) that the
witness was not exposed to compelled testimony, or (2) that the
witness was exposed, but conformed his or her testimony to
prior recorded testimony.8 5 These decisions suggest that prose-
cutors will need to record or "can" the testimony of their prospec-
tive witnesses before any congressional testimony takes place; it
is difficult to imagine any other method of showing that a wit-
ness's exposure to compelled testimony did not change the testi-
mony the witness would have given.86
Prosecutors will have an extremely difficult time going for-
ward with criminal cases under this standard.87 Very often,
they will be unable to "can" the testimony of key witnesses be-
cause witnesses will either not agree to interviews or will invoke
their own Fifth Amendment privileges. Prosecutors may also
have difficulty predicting, early in an investigation, the identity
of witnesses they will need later in the investigation or at trial.
It is also likely that prosecutors will not be fully aware of partic-
ular issues or facts at the time of canned interviews, and so will
simply lack information needed to conduct canned interviews
that sufficiently protect against taint.
84. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
North, 910 F.2d at 855, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
85. North, 910 F.2d at 872-73.
86. Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 376-77.
87. See Michael Gilbert, The Future of Congressional Use Immunity After
United States v. North, 30 AM. CriM. L. REv. 417, 426 (1993) (arguing that the
North decision converted use immunity under the federal statute into transac-
tional immunity).
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Moreover, prosecutors cannot control the exposure of wit-
nesses to the immunized testimony of a defendant. The Iran-
Contra prosecutors themselves knew about and tolerated the
taint in North's and Poindexter's cases, but they did not initiate
or encourage the exposure. The North and Poindexter opinions
do not limit themselves to witness exposure that the prosecution
initiates. The taint occurs regardless of how the witness learns
about the immunized testimony, even if the prosecutor never
learns of the exposure. Prosecutors might show the testimony to
the witness, or some third party intent upon sabotaging the
prosecution might do so. Indeed, a hostile witness might inten-
tionally expose himself or herself to the immunized testimony,
hoping to make later testimony useless to the prosecution.88
Obstruction-of-justice statutes are no cure for the conduct of
potential witnesses. Prosecutors might file criminal obstruction
charges against a witness who deliberately attempts to make his
or her own testimony worthless by exposure to the defendant'simmunized testimony.89 However, it would be most difficult for
a prosecutor to prove that the defendant witness exposed him-
self or herself to the testimony with the purpose of obstructing
the criminal proceedings. Most witnesses will have many legiti-
mate reasons, including the curiosity shared by most citizens,
for listening to the congressional testimony.90
Prosecutors have even less chance of controlling the expo-
sure of witnesses when the defendant gives immunized testi-
mony before Congress (rather than, say, a grand jury or an
administrative agency).9 ' Grand jury testimony - the most
common form of compelled testimony - remains secret,92 and
the prosecutor can be careful to assign different attorneys to the
later criminal case against a defendant who testifies with immu-
88. Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Un-
certain Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 Mn. L. REv. 1011, 1050 (1992).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) (calling for punishment of whomever "cor-
ruptly... influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct
or impede, the due administration of justice").
90. Prosecutors would also have great difficulty proving any false state-
ments case against a congressional witness, since Congress is not a "depart-
ment" or "agency" within the meaning of the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1995).
91. Department of Justice statistics indicate that in Fiscal Year 1992, Con-
gress sought immunity for one witness, administrative agencies sought immu-
nity for 198 witnesses, and Department attorneys sought immunity for 3931
witnesses. Report from the Department of Justice Witness Immunity Unit
(June 7, 1994) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
92. FED. R. Cnms. P. 6(e).
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nity.93 Potential witnesses have no realistic way of exposing
themselves to the compelled testimony. Even testimony com-
pelled at trial will, as a practical matter, be difficult for many
prospective witnesses to review. The proceedings will not typi-
cally be broadcast, and access to the transcript may be limited
by the expense and effort necessary to obtain copies of such
material.
Testimony before Congress, however, is likely to be very
widely reported and available. 94 Indeed, when congressional
hearings receive the press coverage we have come to expect on
matters such as Iran-Contra or Whitewater, it is difficult for any
interested person to avoid exposure. Thus, the problem for pros-
ecutors is most pronounced in cases where Congress - a body
beyond their control - both obtains the immunized testimony
and controls public access to the testimony.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit has made congressional grants of
immunity more costly than immunity grants in other proceed-
ings, and more costly than they have been at any time since the
passage of the 1970 statute. The court's emphasis on the con-
tent of the witness's testimony severely limits the prosecutor's
ability to control damage from the immunized testimony. Prior
to North and Poindexter, a prosecutor could successfully craft
questions for direct or cross-examination of a witness who has
been exposed to the defendant's testimony, provided he or she
took care to base each of the questions on independent evidence.
So long as the investigators and attorneys do not pursue ques-
tions based on the defendant's compelled testimony, courts have
not usually inquired whether the witness's answer to the un-
tainted question relies in some way on the defendant's
testimony.
By shifting scrutiny from the witness's motives to the con-
tent of a witness's testimony, the Iran-Contra opinions have cre-
ated a huge body of potential taint for prosecutors to disprove.
Prosecutors have only a limited ability to anticipate everything
that every witness will say, and cannot document in advance the
independent source for every likely comment. The sheer mass of
material makes it unlikely for a prosecutor to succeed. Indeed,
the Independent Counsel did not even attempt to make the re-
quired showing on remand in the North and Poindexter cases.
93. MANuAL, supra note 67, § 1-11.400.
94. See United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Other circuit courts may decide not to follow North and
Poindexter.95 No other court, however, has considered these
opinions in the context of a congressional grant of immunity. In-
deed, the decisions of other circuits will not often prove helpful
for congressional investigations. As in the Iran-Contra prosecu-
tions, orders compelling a witness to testify before Congress will
most commonly issue from a federal court in the District of Co-
lumbia, and subsequent criminal prosecutions of the executive
branch officials who testified before Congress will most fre-
quently take place in the District of Columbia.
C. CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICES BEFORE AND AFTER NOR.THAND
POZiDEXT'ER
The North and Poindexter opinions make it more difficult for
prosecutors to obtain convictions against defendants after Con-
gress compels testimony from them. It does not necessarily fol-
low, however, that these decisions have changed congressional
practices in granting immunity to witnesses. In this section of
the Article, I attempt to determine whether Congress has indeed
changed its practices.
Congress has been stingy with grants of immunity over the
last twenty-five years. 96 Since Congress passed the statute in
95. The Second Circuit distinguished the North decision in a case involving
a defendant who was immunized during testimony before a state grand jury
and was later prosecuted in federal court for tax violations. The court, however,
approved of the outcome in North on the facts of that case. United States v.
Helmsley, 941 F.2d 7, 82 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1162 (1992)
(stating the prosecutor's burden is met if the substance of the exposed testi-
mony relies on a legitimate source outside of the immunized testimony); see also
United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); Wiley v. Doory, 14
F.3d 993, 998 n.ll (4th Cir. 1994) (entitling prosecutor to qualified immunity
for compelling police officers to take a polygraph test when the officers were
never charged).
The D.C. Circuit recently ruled in favor of the government in a case involv-
ing immunized grand jury testimony. In Kilroy, the prosecution's primary
source of evidence initiated a private audit in Washington aier the defendant
testified with immunity in Las Vegas about unrelated charges. 27 F.3d at 688.
The audit uncovered evidence of the defendant's embezzlement. The govern-
ment was not able to determine whether a newspaper account of the Las Vegas
proceedings influenced the Washington auditor to begin an embezzlement in-
vestigation. Nonetheless, the court sustained the conviction because the de-
fendant could produce no evidence showing anything more than a temporal link
between the Las Vegas story and the Washington audit. Id. The Kilroy case
may signal a retreat from the most extreme implications of the North opinion,
at least for grand jury immunities.
96. Apparently, immunity grants under the 1954 statute were also rela-
tively rare. Congress made no use of the statute at all during its first few years.
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1970, it has requested about 300 court orders compelling the tes-
timony of witnesses. Congress obtained most of those grants of
immunity in clusters, in connection with a few major investiga-
tions. For instance, congressional investigations into Water-
gate, the Iran-Contra Affair, and the assassinations of President
Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. account for roughly three
quarters of Congress's immunity requests.
The following table, drawn primarily from the final reports
of congressional committee investigations, 97 lists many of the
congressional grants of immunity under the 1970 statute:
CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1945-1957, at 121 (1959).
97. In 1991, the Office of Senate Legal Counsel collected references to wit-
ness immunities in the following reports and hearings: Drugs, Law Enforce-
ment and Foreign Policy: The Cartel, Haiti and Central America: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communica-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at
184, 335-36 (1988); Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees International
Union Organized Crime in Chicago: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 4, at 181-84, 252-54, 382-83 (1983); Law Enforcement Undercover Ac-
tivities Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Law Enforcement Un-
dercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 633-34, 684 (1982); Korean Influence Investigation, Part 1: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1977); Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972: Appendix to the Hearings of
the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 2154-55 (1974); SENATE SELECT Comm. ON ETHICS, INVESTIGA-
TION OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, S. REP. No. 223, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1991); SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON
INDIAN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE REC-
OMMENDATIONS 231 (Comm. Print 1989); SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL CoMM.,
REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACIHMT- TRIAL CoMm. ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST
JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. REP. No. 156, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1017 (1989);
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE
NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMM. INVESTIGATING
THE IRAN-CoNTIA AFFAIR, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 686 (1987);
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 1 INVESTIGATION OF SENATOR HERMAN E.
TALMADGE 5 (Comm. Print 1980); REPORT OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AS-
SASSINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1828, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 521 (1978).
The 1991 compilation also referred to United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 3-5
(1st Cir. 1978) (contracting fraud investigation).
In addition to the material compiled by the Office of Senate Legal Counsel
in 1991, the following reports indicate further requests or grants of immunity:
SENATE ETHICS CoMm., 7 DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION OF SENA-
TOR ROBERT PACKWOOD, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (Comm. Print 1995); SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, OVERSIGHT OVER INTELUGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP.
No. 23, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); HOUSE Comm. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
ABUSE AND MISMANAGEMENT AT HUD, H. REP. No. 977, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1990).
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Assassinations of President Kennedy 165
and Martin Luther King, Jr.
(1978)
Government contracting fraud (1978) 1
Ethics investigation of Senator 1
Herman Talmadge (1980)
ABSCAM undercover operation 2
(1982)
Organized crime in hotel and 3
restaurant industries (1983)
Iran-Contra Affair (1987) 26
Narcotics traffic in Central America 1
(1988)
Fraud in Indian programs (1989) 26
Impeachment of Judge Alcee 1
Hastings (1989)
HUD influence-peddling (1990) 1
Ethics investigation of Senator 7
Alfonse D'Amato (1991)
Ethics investigation of senators in 1
Charles Keating/savings and loan
affair (1991)
Confirmation of Director of Central 1
Intelligence Agency (1991)
Ethics investigation of Senator 1
Robert Packwood (1995)
Records from the Department of Justice confirm that this
list covers most of Congress's formal immunity requests since
1987. Between March 1987 and the present, Senate investiga-
tors requested forty-five immunity orders and House investiga-
tors requested seventeen.95
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the North and Poindexter
decisions have discouraged congressional committees from using
immunities in particular cases:
1) The House Energy and Commerce Committee decided, several days
after the issuance of the North opinion in 1990, not to grant immunity
98. The Department of Justice has maintained computerized records on
immunity requests since March 1987. Those records indicate the following re-
quests from Congress for authority to seek a court order compelling a witness to
testify:
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to Michael Milken during an investigation of junk bonds dealing, at
least until after his criminal sentencing.
9 9
2) The Senate Ethics Committee, during its investigation of several
senators implicated in the Charles Keating affair, declined in 1991 to
request an immunity order for Keating because of the importance of a
later criminal prosecution.'
0 0
3) Senator John Kerry established a policy of making no grants of im-
munity during the inquiry by the POW/MIA Committee into whether
American servicemen were knowingly left in Vietnam. 10 1
4) The Committee on House Administration, during its 1992 investiga-
tion of the House Post Office, voted not to request immunity orders for
three key witnesses because of a possible conflict with an ongoing crim-
SENATE REQUESTS

























Report from the Department of Justice Witness Immunity Unit (Sept. 15, 1995)
(on file with the Minnesota Law Review). The Department does not maintain
records on the number of immunity orders Congress actually obtains from the
court, or the number of congressional witnesses who actually testify under a
grant of immunity.
99. Joan Biskupic, Hill Reconsiders Immunity As North Case is Set Back,
48 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT., 2668, 2668 (1990).
100. William Booth, Keating's Lawyer Says Dealings Of Senators May Never
Be Told, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1990, at A8; Helen Dewar, Regulator Faults Sen-
ators for Delay; Intervention Seen Adding to Cost of Keating Case Settlement,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 6, 1990, at A4.
101. Michael Isikoff, 'We Left People Behind,' Perot Tells POW Panel; Texan
Says U.S. Officials Covered Up the Truth, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 1992, at A14.
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inal investigation.1 0 2 More recently, the House decided to postpone
further an Ethics Committee investigation into the Post Office, again
citing concern about interference with criminal investigations.
10 3
5) The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations decided
against using immunities during its 1993 investigation of the misuse of
student grants from the Department of Education.1 0 4
6) Senator Arlen Specter, chair of a subcommittee of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, declared before hearings on the shooting incident be-
tween FBI agents and Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, that the
subcommittee would seek no grants of immunity.1 0 5
The strongest signals yet about Congress's new reluctance
to use immunities have come out of the Whitewater investiga-
tion. Early in 1994, when Democrats controlled the Banking
Committee in both the Senate and the House, they declared that
the committees would not grant any immunities and would de-
lay hearings whenever necessary to avoid inconveniencing Spe-
cial Prosecutor Robert Fiske. Republican members agreed that
the committees should grant no immunities, and concluded on
that basis that no harm could come to the investigation if Con-
gress immediately went forward with hearings. 10 6 Early in
1995, after Republicans took control of the committees, Republi-
can committee leaders reaffirmed the decision not to grant anyimmunities.1 0 7 Throughout this, members of Congress from
both parties explicitly invoked the Oliver North and John
Poindexter cases to explain their opposition to immunity
grants.10 8
102. COMMITrEE ON HousE ADMIN., INVESTIGATION OF THE OFF. OF THE POST-
MASTER, H.R. REP. No. 713, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5, 49-53, 172-84 (1992).
103. Phil Kuntz, Rostenkowski Probe Postponed, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT.,
2436, 2436 (1994).
104. Stacy Parker, The Impact of United States v. North on Use Immunity
and Congressional Investigations: An Uneasy Relationship 20 (Feb. 8, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review). Journalists
also speculated soon after the North case that Congress would be less likely to
use immunity. Biskupic, supra note 99, at 2668; Haynes Johnson & Tracy
Thompson, North Charges Dismissed at Request of Prosecutor, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 1991, at Al; Glenn R. Simpson, Failure in North Case Likely to Mean
Less Hill Immunity, ROLL CA.L, Sept. 19, 1991, at 1.
105. Jon Sawyer, Weaver Makes Case to Senators He Calls for Justice in
Ruby Ridge Killings, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATcH, Sept. 7, 1995, at Al.
106. Andrew Taylor, Hearings on Whitewater Now a Certainty, 52 CONG. Q.
WKLY. RP'r., 654, 654 (1994); Paul M. Rodriguez, Gonzalez Gives In, Calls for
Hearings, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at Al.
107. Labaton, supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Republican
controlled hearings investigating the Whitewater affair and activities at the
Branch Davidian compound). See also 141 CONG. REc. S6771 (daily ed. May 17,
1995) (Whitewater resolution).
108. Andrew Taylor, Senate Panel Plans Broad Probe Of Whitewater This
Summer, 1995 CONG. Q. 1390.
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Despite this strong and recurring rhetoric about discontinu-
ing the use of immunities, Congress has not abandoned the prac-
tice altogether. It has requested several immunity orders since
the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings, including a few immunity re-
quests after the publication of the first North decision in July
1990.109 Senator Specter also declared his willingness, just as
the Ruby Ridge hearings began, to consider immunities for some
witnesses."1.0
Periods of up to nine years have elapsed between major
grants of immunities (ten or more witnesses) in the past. It is
thus too early to conclude that Congress has permanently
changed its ways because of the Iran-Contra experience. It
would be consistent with past patterns if Congress, in the near
future, were to take up another high-priority investigation and
grant a large number of immunities. Congress's current reluc-
tance to compel testimony may continue in the long run to result
in fewer grants of immunity. It may take years, however, to de-
termine whether this current lull is different from other slow
periods in the cyclical grants of immunity.
Several institutional factors suggest that Congress will not
completely abstain from immunity orders for very long. For one
thing, the decision to seek an immunity order is decentralized;
any committee from either house of Congress can obtain an or-
der."' Neither the Senate nor the House require any leadership
group or other centralized group of senators or House members
to evaluate the need for an immunity.
The only centralization in the current process occurs once
an appropriate body has voted to request a court order. House
committees submit requests for immunity orders to the District
Court through the Office of the General Counsel for the House of
Representatives; Senate committees employ the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel. Yet even this degree of centralization has little
effect on the choices that the members make. Members do not
109. See e.g., S. REP. No. 23, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1993) (describing a
July 1991 committee vote to confer immunity on Alan Fiers, a witness relating
to the Iran-Contra affair). Statistics from the Department of Justice's Witness
Immunity Unit show fifteen requests from Congress since July 1990 for author-
ity to seek an immunity order. See supra note 98.
110. Brian McGrory, Senate Panel to Hear Idaho Separatist, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 5, 1995, at 1, 24.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 6005.
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always consult legal staff about their decisions, but simply direct
staff to obtain an order already voted upon.112
Another factor suggests that any apparent changes in the
use of immunity orders will not last. Historically, the investi-
gating committees most likely to issue a large number of immu-
nities are not standing committees. Rather, they are
committees formed specifically to investigate one event or series
of events: Watergate, Iran-Contra, assassinations, and so
forth. 113 They assemble their staffs ad hoc, often drawing them
from private law practice. After the investigation concludes, the
staffers return to private practice. Hence, it is difficult for the
most important users of immunity grants to develop and main-
tain long term expertise or institutional memory on the use of
immunity. 114
Of course, staffers and members of Congress do not neces-
sarily need a rich institutional memory to realize that immunity
orders can be costly. But it is one thing to understand that animmunity order places any later criminal case in peril; it is an-
other to be able to assess the relative need to take such a risk in
different subject areas and at different times. Tunnel vision on
the part of members and staffers investigating a particular issue
or event is a genuine danger. An investigator of financial insti-
tutions may come to believe, for example, that the public must
learn as quickly as possible about financial fraud. Others, with
exposure to a broader range of investigations over time, may
conclude that immunities in this area should not have a very
high priority.
D. THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CURRENT PRACTICES
By increasing the chances that some wrongdoers will avoid
criminal prosecution, the D.C. Circuit's Iran-Contra decisions
increased the costs to the public when Congress relies on an im-
112. This decentralized process for deciding to seek immunity reinforces the
individualistic nature of congressional investigations. Individual members of
Congress pursue investigations for a number of reasons, many of them related
to their prospects for re-election, and are not much constrained in this choice by
party loyalties or the leadership structure of their house. DAVID R. MAYHEW,
DMDED WE GovERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-
1990, at 110-12 (1991) [hereinafter DVDED WE GovERN].
113. See McGeary, supra note 27, at 431-32 (describing congressional prefer-
ence for select committees).
114. Consultations do occur between the special committees and the central-
ized staff who know the most about past grants of immunity (for instance, the
staff of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel). The consultations, however, are
neither required nor routine.
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munity order to obtain testimony. How should Congress re-
spond to this turn of events? If we count only the most obvious
costs of immunity grants, the clear solution is for Congress to
restrain itself and grant fewer immunities. Fewer immunity
grants are not, however, necessarily better because many of the
important but hidden costs of immunity grants will only worsen
if Congress continues to grant fewer immunities.
A few costs of stringent immunity rules are obvious and
spectacular, such as the loss of criminal convictions when Con-
gress immunizes the defendant. These would include convic-
tions overturned on appeal (such as the convictions of Oliver
North and John Poindexter), and charges dismissed at the trial
court (such as charges against Watergate figure Gorden
Strachen).3- 5
Other costs are less visible, such as the criminal charges
never brought because of the prosecution's belief that it would
lose at a Kastigar hearing. It is impossible to say which immu-
nized witnesses over the years might have been prosecuted if not
for a congressional grant of immunity. Given the relatively
small number of immunity grants conferred, however, the abso-
lute number of unfiled criminal cases cannot be large, surely less
than 300 over a period of twenty-five years. Moreover, the
number of prosecutions attempted, even before the Iran-Contra
cases, was not large to begin with.1 16 Thus, the effect of North
and Poindexter in terms of the additional cases that were never
filed would have to be small.117
These costs of immunity grants, however, do not tell half
the story. Most of the costs of the new rules governing the use of
congressional immunity occur when Congress decides not to
compel testimony. A greater reluctance to use compulsion or-
ders will mean less-than-complete congressional investigations.
This, in turn, will postpone and ultimately deaden public debate
about government accountability because the public will not
have timely facts for making judgments.
115. See Strachen, supra note 63, at 816 (describing criminal proceedings
against author's spouse, Gordon Strachen).
116. See, e.g., Sheldon P. Yett, Major Watergate Figures, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY.
RPT. 2671, 2671 (1990) (reporting that of nine criminal prosecutions of Water-
gate figures, seven pleaded guilty; nineteen figures remain uncharged).
117. Nonetheless, suspected official corruption, usually the basis for con-
gressional testimony, could lead to extraordinarily visible criminal cases. When
prosecutors decline to bring charges in these cases, the harm is disproportion-
ate to the small number of cases. Unifiled cases of this type can contribute to
the cynical view that the powerful can always escape criminal accountability.
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I argued earlier that the decentralized process for seekingimmunity grants would make it unlikely that Congress will ab-
stain completely from granting immunities in the long run.118
On the other hand, when Congress investigates a matter under
active criminal investigation, it will grant immunities only
rarely. Indeed, Congress likely will sacrifice its own investiga-
tions in favor of criminal prosecutions far too often. The ordi-
nary patterns of interaction between Congress and criminal
investigators will give members of Congress a distorted view of
the relative importance of congressional and criminal
investigations.
First, many congressional investigations have partisan im-
plications, such as the Whitewater investigation, the inquiry
into the management of the House Post Office, and the ethics
investigations of members of Congress. In such circumstances,
one or another group of committee members will have a strong
incentive to curtail a public inquiry. The fears of criminal inves-
tigators about possible interference from Congress (newly-en-
hanced by the Iran-Contra decisions) may provide a convenient
excuse for congressional committees not to aggressively pursue
investigations. Surely this dynamic explains the willingness of
Democrats during 1994 to limit and delay any hearings about
the Whitewater affair- 19
Prosecutors also have every incentive to identify too broad a
group of witnesses as potential defendants. They cannot know,
early in an investigation, who will ultimately become criminal
defendants. Prosecutors may have strong suspicions that cer-
tain witnesses will not face charges in the end, but they have no
reason to "release" these potential defendants for a congres-
sional investigation. Prosecutors do not directly benefit from
Congress's investigations, and early guesses about the most
likely defendants might prove inaccurate. They have every rea-
son to keep the pool of potential targets as large as possible. As
a result, prosecutors will, more often than not, ask Congress to
forego the testimony of witnesses who will never be charged
with a crime.120
118. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (describing the current
decentralized process for obtaining immunity grants).
119. Reed Irvine & Joe Goulden, Turning a Blind Eye to Whitewater Woes,
WASH. TnmEs, June 22, 1994, at A19.
120. Cf. 1 LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FNAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUN-
SEL FOR IRAN-CoNTRA MATTERS xxiii-xxv, 555-59 (1993) (describing fourteen
prosecutions, and suggesting that Congress avoid immunity grants to any wit-
ness who would ordinarily be a "logical subject for prosecutive consideration").
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Finally, it may be more politically costly for a member of
Congress to undermine a criminal case than it is to investigate
too timidly. If a grant of immunity results in dismissal of crimi-
nal charges months or years after the investigation, political op-
ponents could in hindsight charge the member with
"interference." Opponents might question the member's com-
mitment to punishing corruption, or to fighting crime. In con-
trast, a member is less likely to receive criticism about the
failure of an investigation to inform the public adequately. Even
if the question arises, the member can simply explain that he or
she wanted to avoid interfering with an ongoing criminal inves-
tigation. Just as drug safety regulators tend to fear the one
highly visible accidental death from a quickly-approved drug,
rather than the many deaths occurring because drugs appear on
the market too slowly,' 2 ' members of Congress will too often
avoid immunity grants because their evils are more obvious.
11. REDUCING TUE COSTS OF IMMUNITY GRANTS
Is it possible for Congress to have it both ways? Congress
might search for ways to preserve more potential criminal cases
against witnesses, even after congressional investigators have
granted those witnesses immunity to testify. There are several
plausible strategies for doing so. Unfortunately, none of the
available strategies is likely to succeed in cutting the costs of
immunity grants in the ordinary case. These strategies might
save some criminal prosecutions, but probably only a few.
A. SUBSTANT E AMENDMENTS TO TE I UITY STATUTE
Perhaps the most direct way to reduce the impact of the
North and Poindexter opinions would be to overrule them by
statute. Such legislation might attempt to return immunity law
to its condition before Iran-Contra. An amendment to the fed-
eral immunity statute could accomplish this either by (1) chang-
ing the statute's definition of prohibited "uses" of compelled
testimony, or (2) changing the methods the government may use
to prove that no prohibited use took place.
121. Tom Hamburger & Mike Myers, Losing the Edge: Overseas Patients
Reap the Benefits of U.S. Research While Those Here Wait, MuNAoLs STAR-
TRIB., June 26, 1995, at Al. See also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RiGHTS
REVOLUTioN: RECONCErviNG THE REGULATORY STATE 106-08 (1990) (discussing
a paradox of the regulatory state which can produce self-defeating approaches
that bring about the opposite of their intended purposes).
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Either type of amendment could make it possible once again
to pursue criminal prosecutions against witnesses Congress has
compelled to testify. Both are based on credible readings of the
Supreme Court's current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
However, for reasons described below, either of these' amend-
ments would face a serious constitutional challenge.
1. Amend the Definition of Prohibited "Uses"
Several statutory changes could make it possible once again
for a prosecutor to win a criminal case against a previously-im-
munized witness. An amendment could clarify that the statute
prohibits only those uses of immunized testimony that lead to
new evidence.122 If the prosecutor is exposed to the immunized
testimony, but can still show that each piece of evidence came
from an independent source, the conviction could stand.
An amendment might also specify that use of immunized
testimony by a party other than a prosecutor (or the agent of a
prosecutor) would not constitute a prohibited use. For instance,
if a witness learns about immunized testimony of a defendant
from sources other than the prosecutor, no prohibited "indirect"
use of the testimony has occurred. Senators Lieberman and
Rudman offered one such bill in 1991, although it never became
law.123
122. Thus, the amended statute would repudiate those cases holding that
any prosecutorial exposure to the immunized testimony is a per se violation of
the statute. See United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
872 (1974) (holding that when a prosecutor read a defendant's testimony tran-
script that contained immunized testimony, the possibility of that testimony's
use necessitates case dismissal).
123. S. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REC. S18385 (1991) follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION. 1. IMMUNIZED TESTIMONY.
(a) AMENDMENT OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.-Section
6002 of title 18, United States Code, is amended... by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
(b)(1) Testimony of a witness that is based on the witness's personal
knowledge, irrespective of whether the witness has been exposed to
testimony compelled under subsection (a), shall not be considered to be
directly or indirectly derived from or to constitute a use of such com-
pelled testimony if-
(A) the prosecution has made no use of the immunized testimony; and
(B) the witness was not exposed to the immunized testimony by the
prosecution or by a third party acting, directly or indirectly, at the di-
rection of the prosecution.
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Apart from this one initiative, Congress has not shown
much interest in revising the immunity statute in the five years
since North. And even if Congress were to choose this route in
the near future, a direct statutory repudiation of North would
probably not survive a constitutional challenge.
Even though the North court interpreted a statute, it simul-
taneously interpreted the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Since Kastigar, courts interpreting the immunity
statute have assumed that Congress meant for the statute to
provide protection "co-extensive" with the Fifth Amendment, 124
and there is some indication to that effect in the legislative his-
tory of the statute. 125
The D.C. Circuit in its North opinions clearly stated that the
Constitution, and not just the immunity statute, requires a
strong version of use immunity: "the immunity statute is consti-
tutional only because it is co-extensive with the Fifth Amend-
ment."12 6 The D.C. Circuit, if it follows the holding and the
strong dicta of North, would surely overturn the amended stat-
ute on constitutional grounds. The Fifth Amendment, the court
would say, requires a reversal of any conviction in which a wit-
ness uses compelled testimony to change his or her testimony
(assuming that the change is not harmless error), even if the
(2) This subsection does not affect the prosecution's affirmative duty to
prove that the evidence it proposes to use is otherwise derived from
legitimate sources wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
(3) This subsection shall be applied so as fully to protect a witness's
privilege against self-incrimination in all respects. If, in the particular
circumstances of any case, any provision of this subsection cannot be
applied in a manner that is fully consistent with a witness's privilege
against self-incrimination, the provision shall be applied only to the
extent that it is fully consistent with the witness's privilege against
self-incrimination, and the remainder of this subsection shall be fully
applicable.
124. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,462 (1972); see In re Doyle, 839
F.2d 865, 867 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The immunity granted appellant is coextensive
with his fifth amendment protection."). This language might be construed to
mean that Congress intended to provide in the statute at least as much protec-
tion as required by the Fifth Amendment, and possibly more. But neither the
legislative history nor any cases construing the statute have suggested that a
statute meant to be "co-extensive" with the Fifth Amendment actually provided
more protection than was constitutionally necessary.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970). Contra H.R. REP. No. 1188 at 39-40 (minority
view).
126. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,862 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), mod-
ified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941
(1991).
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prosecutor is not responsible for that witness's exposure to theimmunized testimony.
But the future of an amended immunity statute is by no
means certain. Other circuits have not had many opportunities
to approve or disapprove of the specific elements of a Kastigar
hearing that the D.C. Circuit now requires, although the few
federal courts discussing North thus far have mentioned it with
approval. 127 An amended immunity statute could provoke a re-
thinking of the question in the federal courts. A revision to the
statute might make the issue more visible and increase the
chances that the Supreme Court would address again the types
of uses for compelled testimony the Constitution allows. The
considered views of a coordinate branch on the debatable mean-
ing of a constitutional provision might carry some weight with
the Justices.
a. The Attenuation Doctrine
There are at least two possible lines of argument to support
an amended statute that defines a prohibited "derivative use" to
include only prosecutorial uses and to exclude uses by private
parties, such as witnesses. The first line of argument, which the
dissent in the second North opinion mentions briefly,' 28 is the
doctrine of "attenuation."
Although a Fifth Amendment violation will taint any evi-
dence obtained as a result of the violation (as "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree"), 129 events occurring after the constitutional
violation may be more important in explaining how the govern-
ment obtained the evidence.' 30 The later events thus over-
127. See, e.g., United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 1991) (dis-
tinguishing North, but approving holding), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091 (1992);
United States v. DeSalvo, 797 F. Supp. 159, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (distinguishing
North and noting that the doctrine of use immunity "applied with full force" in
that case), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 192 (1994); United States v. Harris, 780 F.
Supp. 385 (N.D.W. Va. 1991) (citing North as authority that the government
must demonstrate that "the entire basis of the indictment ... is free of the
voiceprints of [defendant's] immunized... testimony"), aff'd, 973 F.3d 333 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Kristel, 762 F. Supp. 1100, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citing North to support conclusion that the government's decision to investi-
gate and prosecute defendant cannot be based on the immunized testimony of
the defendant).
128. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam), modifying, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
941 (1991).
129. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963).
130. See Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1316 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that initial admissions illegally obtained from defendant did not taint defend-
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shadow the constitutional violation; to use torts concepts, the
later events constitute a superseding cause of the prosecution's
acquisition of the evidence.
For instance, a coerced confession may lead police to arrest
a second suspect. If the police release the second suspect, but he
later returns to the police of his own volition to confess and pro-
vide evidence against the first suspect, a court may conclude
that the effect of the original coerced confession was too attenu-
ated to require exclusion of the new evidence. 131 Similarly, the
taint of compelled testimony may become overly attenuated if
enough events occur between the time of the immunity order
and the subsequent use of the testimony. Congress in 1970 may
have intended to invoke this limitation on the definition of evi-
dence derived "indirectly" from a constitutional violation: a com-
mittee report cited to a Supreme Court decision on just this
subject. 132
One problem with the attenuation argument in the immu-
nity context is that it appears to require the passage of time and
events after the constitutional violation occurs. When the prose-
cution obtains evidence as a result of a coerced confession or an
improper search and subsequently introduces that evidence at
trial, events might combine with time to diminish the signifi-
cance of the original constitutional violation. 13 3 On the other
hand, when the government compels a witness to testify, that
person only becomes a "witness against himself" when the gov-
ernment attempts to use the testimony or the fruit of the testi-
mony at the witness's later criminal trial.134 Unlike the coerced
confession or improper search, the constitutional violation here
takes place during the trial itself. Thus, it is difficult to argue
ant's subsequent, lawfully obtained, written confession), cert. denied sub nom.,
Adams v. Evatt, 113 S. Ct. 2966 (1993), and judgment on reh'g vacated, 114 S.
Ct. 1365 (1994); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975) (prohibiting evi-
dentiary use of defendant's statements made less than two hours after his ille-
gal arrest because the court found "no intervening event of significance").
131. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 475-77, 491-92 (finding the evidence admissible
in a case involving substantially similar facts).
132. H.R. REP. No. 1188, supra note 37, at 12 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488); H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 37, at 42 (same).
133. See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05 ("no intervening event of
significance").
134. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843,869 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), mod-
ified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941
(1991); Murphy, supra note 88, at 1033 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
497 F. Supp. 979, 983-84 (E.D. Pa. 1980)).
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that violations of the immunity statute become attenuated after
passage of time and events.13 5
Nevertheless, perhaps the passage of time does not matter
as much as government coercion. When the government com-
pels testimony, it clearly is using its coercive power against the
witness. But is that coercion any greater when the government
later initiates a criminal case and relies on witnesses who, unbe-
knownst to prosecutors, have familiarized themselves with the
compelled testimony? The individual choices of the witnesses
themselves, even though they precede the moment of the consti-
tutional violation at trial, still seem to supersede the govern-
ment's initial choice to compel the testimony and its later
decision to prosecute based on independent evidence.
The attenuation doctrine, when properly analogized to the
common law doctrine of superseding causes, deserves closer at-
tention than it received in North. But even in this form, attenu-
ation offers limited help to the government. If federal courts
were to adopt this doctrine, they would require the government
to show that the use of compelled testimony by prosecution wit-
nesses was unforeseeable, a traditional prerequisite to showing
that some superseding cause relieves a tort defendant of respon-
sibility for her earlier actions. It would be an unusual case
where the prosecution could show that the witness's exposure to
the compelled testimony was unforeseeable, especially when the
compelled testimony takes place in a public hearing before
Congress. 136
b. Private Action
The second line of argument supporting an amended statute
might draw an analogy to the law of private searches. 137 The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches or seizures
by government agents, but it does not stop the government from
using as evidence the information that a private party obtains
135. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF
ToRTs § 44 (5th ed. 1984) for an overview of theories of intervening cause in
tort, and § 52 for a discussion of apportionment of responsibility in cases involv-
ing multiple tortfeasors.
136. The Wong Sun Court did not inquire if the actions of the witness who
later confessed were foreseeable. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
137. This line of argument was not addressed in the North opinions. North,
910 F.2d at 869; North 920 F.2d at 956-57; see also WAYm R. LAFAvE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CamnwAL PROcEDURE § 3.1 at 117-119 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(providing an overview of the exclusionary rule and private party searches).
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during an unreasonable search. 138 Of course, if the government
induces a private party to carry out the search, the search is no
longer "private."13 9 But if the search or seizure takes place at
the initiative of a party truly independent of government con-
trol, then there can be no unconstitutional search or seizure.' 40
Similarly, in the context of immunized testimony, one might
conclude that the government is not responsible for a private-
party witness who relies on compelled testimony to shape testi-
mony or to refresh recollection. So long as the prosecution dis-
courages witnesses from using immunized testimony, insists
that witnesses rely upon their own memory during testimony,
and asks specific questions based on independent sources, the
private party-not the prosecution-is responsible for any "use"
of compelled testimony. Any incidental benefit to the govern-
ment's prosecution would be tolerable here, just as in the private
search context.' 4 '
A defendant might point out at this juncture that compelled
testimony is unlike a private search because government action
(the compulsion order) makes possible the later private use of
information. But the same could be said of some private
searches. Government might make the conditions possible for a
private search-for instance, it may pass and enforce laws al-
lowing landlords reasonable access to tenants' apartments. 142
Even though governmental power might enable a private party
to search, the courts will still place responsibility for the search
with the private party rather than the government.143
In the end, such arguments may fail to convince the D.C.
Circuit to overrule its current expansive definition of prohibited
"uses" of testimony. The North opinions are peppered with abso-
lute language about the use of compelled testimony: "The polit-
138. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921); see also Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) ("The most outrageous behavior by a private
party seeking to secure evidence against the defendant does not make that evi-
dence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.").
139. United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981).
140. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.8 at 175 (2d ed. 1987).
141. Id. § 1.8 at 175, 177.
142. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.18 (A)(Michie 1995) (granting land-
lords right of reasonable access to tenant's apartments).
143. Compare LAFAvE supra note 140, § 1.8(b) (discussing evidentiary ef-
fects of specific government instigation of private search) with id. § 1.8(c) (dis-
cussing evidentiary effects of "other pre-search encouragement" by
government).
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ical needs of the majority, or Congress, or the President never,
never, never, should trump an individual's explicit constitu-
tional protection." 144 Unless the court takes a different and
more accommodating view of immunity grants, it is not likely to
view the actions of government witnesses as "private" action.
If all the federal courts follow the route mapped out by the
D.C. Circuit, it might take a Supreme Court opinion redefining
the contours of the Fifth Amendment before Congress could suc-
cessfully amend the statute. Such an opinion could, consistent
with the history of the Fifth Amendment, conclude that the
Fifth Amendment allows prosecutors to use all the evidentiary
fruit of compelled testimony, but not the testimony itself.145
Barring such a profound reshaping of the self-incrimination
privilege, however, Congress would be safer to choose some more
oblique strategies and not confront the North requirements
directly.
2. Amend the Method for Proving Lack of Taint
An amendment to the immunity statute would stand a bet-
ter chance of survival under current law if it were geared to the
procedure or the allocation of the burden of proof, rather than
the definition of "use." On these procedural questions, the Fifth
Amendment text is silent.1 46
Chief Judge Wald's dissents in both of the North opinions
distinguished between prosecutorial exposure to immunized tes-
timony and witness exposure to the testimony.147 Chief Judge
Wald proposed a special allocation of the burden of proof when a
defendant only alleges that witnesses have used immunized
testimony.1 48
In such cases, a prosecutor would need to establish a prima
facie case of no taint by showing (1) an independent source for
the identity of each witness, (2) an independent source for all
144. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam), modifying 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
941 (1991); see also North, 910 F.2d at 869 ("If the government chooses [to com-
pel and immunize testimony], then ... it is taking a great chance that the
witness cannot constitutionally be prosecuted.").
145. See generally Akhil R. Amar & Renee Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 ILCH. L. REv. 857, part H (1995)
(elaborating the argument that the Fifth Amendment permits use of eviden-
tiary fruit of compelled testimony).
146. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V, ci. 3.
147. North, 920 F.2d at 954 (Wald, C.J., dissenting); North, 910 F.2d at 914
(Wald, C.J., dissenting).
148. North, 920 F.2d at 954-55 (Wald, C.J., dissenting).
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questions asked of the witnesses, (3) warnings to all witnesses to
base their testimony only upon personal knowledge, and (4) de-
livery to defense counsel of all recorded statements of witnesses.
Once the prosecution has shown such a prima facie case, the de-
fendant would have to produce some specific evidence (but not
conclusive evidence) that the testimony was in fact tainted. If
the defendant could not produce such evidence, the trial court
would not need to hold a hearing on the question. 149 Congress
might amend the immunity statute to endorse just this sort of
allocation of the burden of proof in cases where the prosecutors
themselves have avoided exposure to the compelled testimony.
Such a procedural approach to amending the statute would
stand a better chance of survival in a constitutional challenge
than a statute attempting to overturn the North court's broad
definition of derivative use. Lower federal courts have devel-
oped the contours of use immunity by studying nuances of
the 1972 Kastigar opinion, rather than the text, history or struc-
ture of the Fifth Amendment itself. And Kastigar itself specifies
only that the government retain an "affirmative" and "heavy"
burden.150
In some other contexts, courts have assigned to defendants
some burden of producing evidence even when the ultimate bur-
den of proof remains with the government. For instance, a de-
fendant claiming the defense of entrapment must show that the
government induced him to commit the crime. Only after the
defendant comes forward with evidence of entrapment does the
government have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.151
149. Id. The D.C. Circuit in a recent case apparently placed the burden of
production on a defendant to show that a key government witness relied on
earlier immunized testimony by the defendant in deciding to audit the defend-
ant. The audit provided key evidence in the criminal case. See Kilroy v. United
States, 27 F.3d 679, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
150. 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972). See Douglas A. Turner, Nonevidentiary
Use of Immunized Testimony: Twenty Years After Kastigar and the Jury is Still
Out, 20 AM. J. CRnm. L. 105, 130-31 (1992) (arguing for placing the initial bur-
den of production on the defendant alleging nonevidentiary use of compelled
testimony).
151. See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (reversing,
on grounds of entrapment, defendant's conviction for receiving child pornogra-
phy through the mails); United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 467 (1st Cir.
1994) (noting that prosecution need answer entrapment defense only after de-
fendant has met burden of production sufficient to raise that defense); United
States v. Holmes, 13 F.3d 1217, 1221 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v.
Budd, 23 F.3d 442, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 910
(1995); United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 44 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that
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The various burdens of proof for exclusionary rule hearings
also support shifting a burden of production to the defense in
some Kastigar hearings. In a hearing to establish the voluntari-
ness of a confession, the prosecution carries both the burden of
persuasion and the burden of production.' 52 The prosecution
also carries the burden when attempting to introduce evidence
seized during a warrantless search. However, the defendant car-
ries the burden of proof when attempting to exclude evidence
obtained during a warranted search, because a warrant makes a
search presumptively reasonable. 153
When the prosecution has effectively insulated itself from
the compelled testimony of a defendant, is the best analogy the
involuntary confession cases (where the prosecution has the bur-
den) or the warranted search cases (where the defendant has the
burden)? Certainly a Kastigar hearing, like a voluntariness
hearing for a confession, involves the admission of evidence po-
tentially derived from an involuntary statement of the defend-
ant. But the primary concern with a coerced confession taken in
a police station is its reliability. 5'9 If prosecution witnesses base
their story in part on what they hear during the defendant's
compelled testimony before a congressional committee, there is
no particular reason to question the accuracy of the evidence.
The defendant had every reason to tell the truth during the com-
pelled testimony; if anything, a witness's exposure to the com-
pelled testimony will sharpen her memory of events involving
the defendant. 155
The leading concern with witness exposure to compelled tes-
timony is not the reliability of the evidence, but the propriety of
the government's behavior in obtaining the evidence, whatever
its reliability. When the prosecutors have avoided any exposure
defendant bears burden of production on both inducement and "non-predisposi-
tion" to commit the crime), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 (1991).
152. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972) ("[T]he prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance
of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.").
153. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 137, § 10.3(b). The decision in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), makes this shift in the burden of proof less
important, because for many warranted searches there is now a "good faith ex-
ception" to the exclusionary rule, and the defendant will have no opportunity to
carry a burden of proof at a suppression hearing. Leon does not apply, however,
to all warranted searches in the federal courts, and does not apply at all in some
state courts. Thus, there are still some suppression hearings where the defend-
ant will carry the burden of proof.
154. See, LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 137, § 6.2(a) & n.3 (noting traditional
judicial concern that such confessions are untrustworthy).
155. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
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to immunized testimony, and have taken steps to ensure that
witnesses will not rely on such testimony, perhaps the govern-
ment deserves a presumption that prosecutors acted properly,
just as courts presume that warranted searches are reasonable.
This line of argument might prove too much, for it suggests
that the defendant should carry both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion once the prosecutor has shown no
exposure to immunized testimony and adequate efforts to pre-
vent witness use of the testimony. Kastigar, however, says that
the "burden" remains with the prosecutor. A shift in the burden
of production, therefore, is the most that a federal court can re-
quire of a defendant and remain consistent with Kastigar. This
position is a compromise that carves out an area where the court
can presume that the prosecution behaved appropriately.
Even if procedural amendments to the statute have the best
chance of surviving constitutional challenge, such a solution
would probably give a smaller benefit to prosecutors than a stat-
ute that redefines prohibited derivative uses. Although the de-
fendant might sometimes fail to carry a burden of production,
the burden will shift back to the prosecution in many cases. Be-
cause it is sufficient to prove that any material witness changed
his or her testimony because of exposure to the defendant's com-
pelled testimony, it will not be difficult for defendants to meet
their burden by producing some evidence on the issue.
3. All Immunities or Only Congressional Immunities?
If Congress decides to amend the statute in either of the
ways discussed above, it must decide on the scope of the
changes. Should the revisions apply to all the federal immunity
statutes, or only to immunity orders that Congress requests?
There is surely a virtue in uniformity, providing the same
immunity for all compelled testimony, regardless of the forum.
The uniform approach avoids any suggestion that Congress im-
poses on executive branch immunities (that is, compelled testi-
mony before a grand jury, a trial court, or an administrative
tribunal) a heavier burden than it imposes on the immunities
granted during its own investigations. It affirms that Congress
can live with the same rules it imposes on other investigators.
Nevertheless, while the need for uniformity is legitimate,
there are special concerns involved with congressional testi-
mony. For instance, the news media disseminates congressional
testimony much more broadly than testimony before a grand
jury, thus increasing the risk of exposure and taint. Congres-
[Vol. 80:407
19951 CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 449
sional testimony also has unique value. It goes to questions of
self-government, to questions of national priorities. If Congress
fails to get critical testimony during its hearings, it might draft
statutes poorly, or it might fail to hold executive officials politi-
cally accountable for serious misconduct.
Loss of crucial information in a criminal case could under-
mine a conviction for one person, and foreclose one set of poten-
tial punishments for that person. But loss of crucial information
during congressional hearings may have effects reaching far be-
yond a single case, however important that case may be. The
special difficulties arising from congressional immunities, to-
gether with the unique value of congressional testimony, might
justify special immunity rules for Congress.
B. RELIANCE ON EXECUTWVE SESSIONS
Congress might also attempt to reduce immunity costs by
changing the investigative techniques it uses after an immunity
grant. If Congress could investigate in a way that reduces the
amount of public exposure to compelled testimony, more crimi-
nal cases could survive. It would not be necessary to amend the
statute to change the legal consequences of exposing prosecutors
or their witnesses to immunized testimony.
For example, one of the chief difficulties in the criminal case
against Oliver North was a factor arguably within Congress's
control: the easy access of potential prosecution witnesses to
North's immunized testimony before Congress. The testimony
was broadcast so widely that it would have been difficult to
avoid seeing or hearing it. Most of the prospective witnesses
had no particular incentive to avoid North's testimony, and
every reason to study it carefully.
Prosecutors would applaud if Congress, after it grants im-
munity, takes steps to make the testimony less widely available.
For instance, congressional investigators could take testimony
more often in executive session, closed to the public. 156 Congres-
sional investigations could also rely on depositions before the
members of Congress begin their questioning. Limiting the pub-
licity surrounding compelled testimony could make it easier for
prosecutors to avoid exposing themselves to the taint, and could
reduce the number of witnesses exposed.
156. See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A
REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 160-63 & nn.51-56 (1989) (re-
viewing ways in which public access to congressional proceedings may be
limited).
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Greater use of executive sessions, however, will limit the
impact of a congressional immunity grant only in exceptional
cases. In most cases, Congress will insist on a public forum for
the testimony. There are many reasons this will occur. Mem-
bers of Congress may be convinced that the public deserves to
hear about a topic important enough to justify hearings and a
request for a compulsion order.157 They may also want the op-
portunity to appear in the media in a publicized investigation -
surely one of the motives of congressional investigators in the
Whitewater affair.' 58 The members might also want to avoid
charges from the press, and perhaps from the public, that execu-
tive sessions are merely a cover for incompetent, insincere, or
corrupt investigations.
Even if Congress uses executive sessions to limit the public-
ity of compelled testimony, the most interested parties (the po-
tential witnesses in a later criminal trial) are still likely to learn
about the content of the testimony. 159 Interested parties will re-
view carefully any report or other work product of the commit-
tee, which often will be based on the compelled testimony. Third
parties could also learn of the substance of the testimony
through leaks to the press.
Although executive sessions do not promise a comprehen-
sive solution to the problems of immunity grants, their selective
use could limit the negative effects of some immunities on later
criminal cases. Committees might use executive sessions to
identify particular subjects to focus upon in the later public tes-
timony of the witness. Just as important, the committee staff
might identify, during interviews preceding a public hearing,
certain areas of inquiry that are collateral to Congress's investi-
gative purposes, but that might interfere in a later prosecution.
Questioners at the later public testimony could be careful to
avoid questions on the most damaging and unproductive sub-
jects. Even though the executive session testimony does qualify
as compelled testimony, Congress can at least use the executive
157. See ROBERT K. CARR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTI-
GATING COmmITTEES 52-53 (1955).
158. McGeary, supra note 27, at 430; Jerry Voorhis, Inner Workings, 18 U.
Cm. L. Rsv. 455, 456 (1951); Henry H. Glassie & Thomas M. Cooley, Congres-
sional Investigations- Salvation in Self-Regulation, 38 GEO. L.J. 343, 345-46
(1950).
159. TIEFER, supra note 156, at 162.
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session to screen from wide public exposure some of the possible
subjects of testimony.160
C. MoRE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATioNS
Congress also inflates the costs of immunity when it im-
pedes a criminal prosecution with an immunity grant, yet fails
to get much valuable information in return. Some members of
Congress and their staff feel that this was part of the problem in
Oliver North's case.' 61 North was able to testify on highly
favorable terms, and his questioners were unable to insist on a
complete and accurate accounting from him.
For instance, North and his attorney objected to testifying
during a closed session with congressional staffers. North ar-
gued that Congress could only compel testimony before a com-
mittee or subcommittee or the body as a whole: it could not
compel deposition testimony to staff.162 Although Iran-Contra
committee members were convinced that the statute did em-
power them to compel such testimony, the prospect of a dilatory
court challenge from North was enough to convince the commit-
tee not to press the issue. The lack of any pre-hearing interroga-
tion of North made it difficult to select areas of interest to
highlight, and areas of ambiguity or obfuscation to pursue more
aggressively at the hearing. 63
160. This approach depends on the good faith of members and their staff. A
member intent on undermining a criminal prosecution could still do so despite
the efforts of the committee to limit immunity damage during executive ses-
sions. Political reprisals against such a member would be the most readily
available response.
161. 1 WALSH, supra note 120, at 426.
162. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANuAL 33-34 (3d ed. 1995) (providing
a description of staff depositions) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT MAmuAL]. North's at-
torney argued that the statute did not extend to depositions conducted by
House or Senate staff because 18 U.S.C. § 6005 only speaks of immunity for
testimony in "proceedings before" a congressional committee or either House.
The legislative history, along with the language of the accompanying § 6002 of
the statute, make it clear that the order could be used to compel deposition
testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (providing immunity for testimony "in a proceed-
ing before or ancillary to... either House of Congress,... or a committee or
subcommittee of either house"); Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 409 (1969). But see United
States v. Brennan, 214 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (rejecting defendant's argu-
ment that the 1952 version of the immunity statute immunized voluntary state-
ments made to committee staff), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 830 (1954).
163. See ToOBIN, supra note 11, at 66-68 (1991) (disussing the implications
of North's pre-hearing unavailibility); Carroll J. Doherty, A Need to Get the
Facts Out, 48 CONG. Q. WKLy. RPT. 2669, 2669 (1990) (same).
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Congress can avoid some problems of this sort by amending
the immunity statute to explicitly authorize compelled testi-
mony during staff depositions as well as during the hearings
themselves. Congress considered, but did not pass, legislation to
this effect after the Iran-Contra hearings ended.164 Such an
amendment, however, would not prevent all future instances of
ineffective investigation. Investigations can break down for any
number of reasons. Perhaps the best way for Congress to
get full value for any immunities it grants is to hire experienced
staff members to direct aggressive and uncompromising
investigations.
D. DELAYED INVESTIGATIONS
Once it becomes apparent that Congress will grant immu-
nity to a witness, prosecutors investigating the case can ask for
as much time as possible before the testimony takes place. Dur-
ing the interim, the prosecutors can contact as many prospective
witnesses as possible, record sources of evidence currently
known, and otherwise prepare for any eventual Kastigar
hearing.165
Congress has been willing in the past to cooperate with such
requests. During the Iran-Contra investigation, the committee
agreed to delay questioning North, Poindexter and others to give
the Independent Counsel more time to pursue the criminal in-
vestigation. More recently, congressional investigators of the
FBI shooting incident at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, negotiated with the
Department of Justice to give criminal investigators more time
to work before the hearings reached the most sensitive topics.
Given the urgent and usually politicized nature of congres-
sional hearings, Congress may not consistently grant prosecu-
tors adequate time to prepare for the impending testimony.
North and Poindexter only increase the likelihood of this because
they virtually force prosecutors to conduct exhaustive canned in-
terviews of all potential witnesses. More criminal cases might
remain viable if prosecutors could point to a statutory provision
giving them a fixed amount of time for further investigation,
rather than leaving the amount of delay to negotiations in indi-
vidual cases. The current immunity statute allows the Attorney
164. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1988) (to accompany
S. 2350, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)) (indicating intent to remove ambiguity in
statute); see also 1 WALSH, supra note 120, at 426.
165. JOHN GRABOw, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 3.6(b) (1988).
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General to delay the issuance of the compulsion order by twenty
days; 166 perhaps an increase to ninety days would give the pros-
ecutor a more realistic period to prepare the complicated crimi-
nal cases that usually are involved in congressional hearings.
Giving the prosecutor unilateral power to delay an immu-
nity grant for as long as ninety days may, however, prove too
politically costly. The timing of congressional investigations is
critical. To delay congressional hearings on an issue currently
receiving public attention can change the atmosphere of the in-
quiry dramatically; delay can even mean that Congress will drop
the subject entirely. Congress is unlikely to cede this question of
timing to prosecutors. Given that Congress is a representative
body with the responsibility to consider the relative importance
of many possible agenda items, it is better suited than a crimi-
nal investigator (who has only one priority to consider) to decide
timing issues.
III. DELIBERATING THE COSTS OF IMMUNITY GRANTS
Even after Congress exhausts all of its potential methods
for reducing the costs of immunity, some conflicts between con-
gressional and prosecutorial investigators will remain. Unless
Congress is to stop hearing testimony on volatile public issues, it
will usually not be able to avoid the hard choice between immu-
nity during congressional hearings and a viable criminal
prosecution.
Congress might, therefore, consider methods to promote
better deliberation about its need for witness immunity before it
makes the request for a court order. Those methods include (1)
the adoption of substantive criteria for determining which wit-
nesses deserve immunity despite the high price, and (2) the
adoption of new procedural mechanisms for weighing such costs.
A. SUBsTANTvE CRIrERiA
It is impossible to say what criteria various committees use
when they determine that a particular witness should receive
166. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(c). The Attorney General apparently does not often
invoke the current 20-day period. The prosecutor can routinely negotiate a pe-
riod longer than 20 days. Congress sometimes will give informal notice to pros-
ecutors before it makes the formal request for authorization. The extra notice
time allows the prosecution to begin checking for possible grounds for objec-
tions. The independent counsel has the same power as the Attorney General to
delay the grant of a court order compelling a congressional witness to testify.
28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(7) (1994).
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immunity for testimony. On occasion, a member of Congress
might articulate some basis for making a particular immunity
grant, but more frequently the decision goes unexplained except
in the most general terms. Because of the importance of such
decisions, Congress as a whole may wish to delineate the criteria
that committees should consider as they decide immunity ques-
tions. Congress could embody such criteria in a statute, but a
less formal vehicle such as internal rules might accomplish the
task just as well.
Consistent and effective substantive criteria, however, will
prove elusive. It is virtually impossible to extrapolate from re-
cent congressional investigations general principles that de-
scribe where immunity was either clearly appropriate or
inappropriate. For instance, after reflection upon the Iran-Con-
tra proceedings, Congress might decide that it will be more in-
clined to grant immunity for cases of alleged high-level
misconduct in the executive branch. Such incidents seem to call
for immediate public attention and debate.16 7
Incidents other than Iran-Contra show, however, that high-
level misconduct would be too general a prerequisite for immu-
nity. Although Samuel Pierce, Secretary of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development during the Bush administra-
tion, was charged with official misconduct, Congress was unani-
mous in opposing any grant of immunity to him. Members of
Congress considered the potential criminal cases against Pierce
and other officials at HUD far too important to jeopardize.168
The same appears to be true for high-ranking Clinton adminis-
tration figures charged with wrongdoing, such as Ron Brown,
Henry Cisneros, and Mike Espy. There is no sentiment in Con-
gress for using immunities to investigate their activities.
What makes the Pierce case a time to refrain from immuni-
ties, while the North case remains (for some, at any rate) a time
when the cost of immunity was well worth paying? Both cases
involved government officials with mixed motives - both Pierce
and North believed that the public good required some depar-
ture from literal legal requirements, but both also profited per-
sonally from their wrongdoing. Both cases involved deep-seated
management problems that Congress could have addressed
167. See Zeev Segal, The Power to Probe into Matters of Vital Public Impor-
tance, 58 TuL. L. REv. 941, 943 (1984) (arguing that it is essential in all cases to
bring official misconduct to the public's attention).
168. Gwen Ifl, Immunity for HUD Aide Is Said to Be Unlikely; Thornburgh
Probe Takes Precedence, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1990, at A14.
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through legislation or the budget process. Both cases received
media coverage, although one received considerably more.169
Both involved a small group of potential witnesses. The differ-
ence between the Pierce and North cases is not readily
apparent. 170
Instead of looking to the prominence of the alleged wrongdo-
ers under investigation, Congress might look to the seriousness
of the alleged conduct as a source of criteria for granting immu-
nities. One might argue that Congress could decide to conduct
hearings and grant any necessary immunities whenever the
Justice Department requests appointment of an independent
counsel; such an appointment perhaps serves as a rough proxy
for the most serious allegations of official misconduct because
the independent counsel statute applies to the highest level ex-
ecutive officials. Yet this approach would surely be over-inclu-
sive, for independent counsels (or more recently, special
prosecutors) are appointed to investigate a wide range of official
misconduct. 171 Further, the appointment of an independent
counsel may argue for just the opposite result: It could be an
indication that criminal charges are especially important, and
should remain unpoliticized to the extent possible.
It may be easier to identify criteria for cases when the cost
of an immunity will be especially low. For instance, there may
be times when Congress might offer immunity to a witness who
has already been convicted. 172 Although such an immunity may
impede a later criminal prosecution (say, under state law), Con-
gress may decide that there is little relative value in additional
criminal sanctions.
169. MAYHEw, supra note 112, at 25 (listing both Iran-Contra and HUD in-
vestigations as "major" investigations, HUD receiving 23 days of front-page
newspaper coverage and Iran-Contra receiving 95).
170. Biskupic, supra note 99, at 2668, 2671-72; Arthur L. IAman & Mark A.
Belnick, Congress Had to Immunize North, WASH. POST, July 29, 1990, at C7.
Perhaps the major difference between the two cases was the possible involve-
ment of the President in one of the incidents. To the extent that President Rea-
gan was suspected of official wrongdoing while in office, his ability to govern
was called into question. The prospect of such paralysis made a delay, while
waiting for criminal investigators to complete their work, out of the question.
Note the contrast to the Whitewater affair, where the central allegations in-
volve associates of President Clinton, or about his own conduct many years
before he took national office.
171. See KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 74-85 (1992) (discussing the variety of con-
texts in which special prosecutors are employed).
172. See Biskupic, supra note 99, at 2668, 2670 (indicating the possibility ofimmunity being granted after conviction).
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Similarly, lower-cost immunities may also be possible in sit-
uations where civil sanctions will overshadow the criminal sanc-
tions available against a potential congressional witness. When
the civil sanctions include debarment from contract work with
the government (say, for a defense contractor),173 or major sanc-
tions from regulatory agencies (perhaps for a licensed commodi-
ties broker),' 74 or a false claims action to recover government
funds, 175 a possible criminal conviction may just duplicate al-
ready significant sanctions. In such a circumstance, Congress
might decide that the loss of a criminal conviction is not a very
high price to pay if immunized testimony can contribute to an
important investigation.
Congress might also decide to grant immunities more freely
to federal officers who could later face a realistic possibility of
impeachment. If Congress were to give new life to this near-
moribund check on executive and judicial power,176 investiga-
tors might reason that an impeachment and conviction would be
the most fitting punishment for malfeasance in office, and could
justify the possible loss of a criminal conviction.
A survey of past immunity recipients does not, in the end,
yield a ready set of criteria for Congress to apply in choosing
whether the need for effective congressional investigation out-
weighs the possible loss of criminal prosecution. The fundamen-
tal problem is that there are few cases where the value of
testimony is high for congressional investigators but low for
criminal investigators. Generally speaking, those persons with
the information that most needs public airing are also the most
attractive criminal defendants. Specific substantive criteria
may help choose whether to grant immunity in a few easy cases;
yet most choices about congressional immunity will remain close
questions, and Congress will remain both unwilling and unable
to resolve these questions satisfactorily by drafting such
guidelines.
173. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.403 (1995) (listing civil sanctions available against
government contractors for certain types of misconduct).
174. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3) (1994) (listing civil sanctions available against
commodities merchants for certain types of misconduct).
175. E.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1994) (indicating actions and remedies
available for making false claims against the government).
176. For a thoughtful proposal to make impeachment of judges easier to ac-
complish, see generally Maria Simon, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Behav-
ior"; Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1617 (1994).
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B. REQUEST MECHANISMS
Instead of substantive criteria for immunity requests, Con-
gress might create procedural devices to promote deliberation in
its use of immunity. The current statute requires the judge rul-
ing upon the request to determine that a majority of the mem-
bers present in one house, or two-thirds of a committee, voted to
request the immunity order. The judge must also give ten days
notice to the Attorney General, and must delay the issuance of
the order an additional twenty days if the Attorney General asks
for more time. 77 These statutory voting requirements and the
brief waiting period may not sufficiently focus the attention of
Congress on the need for immunity in a particular case, or the
costs of an immunity grant. Congress could supplement the
statutory requirements with internal rules designed to prevent
hasty consideration, or requests by a small group of members
who do not reflect the views of the body as a whole.
Two features of the current system make hasty or unrepre-
sentative requests more likely. As discussed earlier, the current
system is highly decentralized: any full committee can vote to
grant an immunity.' 78 Further, institutional memory or exper-
tise among staff members is not widely dispersed, and can go
unnoticed or unheeded by the members of Congress and commit-
tee staffs who make the decisions about immunity.
Either house of Congress might address these problems by
passing internal rules designed to centralize consideration of im-
munity questions in the hands of a few members; this might al-
low those members to develop consistency and expertise. New
rules might require any committee wishing to obtain an order
compelling a witness to testify to win the approval of a desig-
nated clearinghouse for immunity questions. Perhaps the
proper body would be an existing committee, such as the Senate
Judiciary Committee or the House Government Operations
177. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(c). See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the historical development of the immunity statute).
178. The full committee voting requirement originated with the 1954 ver-
sion of the congressional immunity statute. Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 769, 68 Stat.
748 (1954); 99 CONG. REc. 8646-63 (1953). In 1953, there were 15 standing
committees in the Senate, and 19 in the House; in the 104th Congress there are
17 in the Senate and 19 in the House. There were 11 joint committees in 1953,
there are 4 today. 1 CONG. INDEX, 104th Cong. (CCH), 12051-63 (1995); 2 id. at
26151-721 (1995); 1 GARRISON NELSON & CLARK H. BENSEN, COMMITTEES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS 1947-1992, COMMITTEE JURISDIcTIONS AND MEMBER ROSTERS
867-999 (1993).
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Committee. The Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations could also be a candidate.
Rather than giving approval power to an existing commit-
tee, the rules may require instead the approval of leadership
groups in the House or the Senate, such as the leadership
groups now consulted on intelligence issues.17 9 As with intelli-
gence questions, the leadership group that would approve all im-
munity requests would have to be discreet. Immunity requests
are often made under seal, to prevent premature disclosure of a
committee's investigative strategy.180
Another centralizing option would be to amend the immu-
nity statute to require a majority vote by the full Senate or
House (or both) before any grant of immunity.181 While this
would assure that any request for immunity accurately reflects
the political judgment of the body as a whole, it does not allow
much expertise on immunity requests to develop. Indeed, it may
reduce the quality and amount of deliberation involved because
a large group will probably devote less time and attention to the
question than a smaller group with a more focused interest in
the investigation.
Given the power of the committee structure, 8 2 it seems rea-
sonable to predict that the power to request immunities will re-
main with the various committees themselves. Even so, if the
rules required that all committees consult with some centralized
support staff before granting immunity, they would achieve
some but not all of the benefits of centralization. The staff could
certainly develop an expertise and experience regarding investi-
179. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 310,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. Rule XLVIII (1995) (governing committees on intelli-
gence); SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc.
No. 1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 79.13 (1993) (same).
180. See SENATE ETHICS Comm. 7 DocUmENTs RELATED TO THE INVESTIGA-
TION OF SENATOR ROBERT PACKWOOD, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (Comm. Print
1995) (immunity order obtained under seal).
181. Apparently the 1857 immunity statute did not require a vote from the
full House or Senate: "[No person examined and testifying before either House
of Congress, or any committee of either House, shall be held to answer crimi-
nally in any court of justice, or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact
or act touching which he shall be required to testify." Act of Jan. 24, 1857, cl.
19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156 (1857); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 427
(1857) (discussing the history of the immunity statute). The same was true of
the 1862 version of the statute. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862).
182. See generally STEVEN S. SMIrrH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMIT-
TEES IN CONGRESS (2d ed. 1990) (analyzing the congressional committee
process).
[Vol. 80:407458
1995] CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 459
gative needs, the impact of immunities on criminal enforcement,
and the history of immunity grants. Repositories of such exper-
tise already exist (although committees have no obligation to
utilize them before they vote) in the Office of Senate Legal Coun-
sel and in the Office of General Counsel for the House of
Representatives.18 3
A staff support group would be less able than a centralized
group of Senators or House members to create adequate deliber-
ation on the immunity question. Given the political exigencies
of many congressional investigations, the requesting committee
may have little incentive to consult the centralized staff in any-
thing more than a pro forma fashion. Moreover, when the im-
munity question requires a legislative judgment about the
relative political importance of different instances of wrongdo-
ing, the committee cannot and should not defer entirely to staff
members.18 4
IV. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL
IMMUNITY GRANTS
Very few strategies for dealing with the costs of immunity
grants have caught the attention of Congress, and none have
borne fruit.1 8 5 It is hard to blame Congress for its failure to take
183. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
the House and senate legal counsel offices in making decisions regarding grants
of immunity).
184. If Congress does not choose to require consultation with centralized
staff, it still may wish to empower some support office to provide periodic educa-
tion about the effects of immunity to committees often engaged in investiga-
tions with criminal ramifications. See OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 162, at
34-35 (stating that recent court decisions "appear to make the prosecutorial
burden substantially more difficult, if not insurmountable" and advising as fol-
lows: "[A] committee might wish to consider, on the one hand, its need for [a
witness's] testimony in order to perform its legislative, oversight, and informing
functions, and on the other, the possibility that the witness's immunized con-
gressional testimony could jeopardize a successful criminal prosecution").
Given the breadth of federal criminal provisions, this would include virtually
every committee on Capitol Hill. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The
Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About
It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878-82 (1992) (discussing the ever-widening definition
of criminal conduct); see generally Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial Responses to
the Recent Enforcement Activities of the Federal Banking Regulators, 59 FoRD-
H~m L. REv. S193 (1991) (examining the increasingly expanding definition of
criminal conduct in the context of bank regulation).
185. See, e.g., S. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S18385 (1991)
(describing an attempt to amend the immunity statute in such a way as to legis-
latively overrule the North decision).
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any action in the five years since the North decision,' 8 6 because
political considerations often make pointless any changes in im-
munity laws and practices. Immunities are surely more costly
than they need to be, but members of Congress have powerful
political reasons to keep them that way.18 7 The Whitewater in-
vestigations offer the most recent and vivid examples.
Representative Henry Gonzalez, a Democrat, chaired the
House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee when al-
legations about President Clinton's investment in the Whitewa-
ter development first surfaced. Gonzalez resisted the calls of
Republican committee members to hold hearings on the matter
because he considered the Whitewater matter to be a "premedi-
tated Republican plan to do in the President." 8 8 He asked
Whitewater Special Prosecutor Robert Fiske to appear before
his committee to explain "the scope and findings" of the first
phase of Fiske's investigation.'8 9 Gonzalez hoped that this testi-
mony would reveal "how much of the Whitewater furor is simply
partisan hysteria." 190 Fiske refused to testify before the com-
mittee because it would "compromise" his effectiveness as a spe-
cial prosecutor. 191 Fiske also asked the committee not to call as
witnesses several key figures in the incidents he was investigat-
ing. Fiske's reason, again, was a concern that congressional tes-
timony by these witnesses would compromise the
investigation. 192
186. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(per curiam),
modifying 910 F.2d 843, 851-52 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2235 (1991); see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the North
holding regarding the improper use of immunized testimony).
187. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNEC-
TION 132-34 (1974) (analyzing the political benefits accruing to Congress when
it acts symbolically rather than substantively).
188. Fiske Refusal to Testify Draws Fire, COM. APPEAL (MEMPHis), July 16,
1994, at A5; see also Andrew Taylor, Gonzalez's Reluctance Complicates White-
water Hearings Picture, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT. 842, 842-43 (1994) (analyzing
the implications of Gonzalez's actions).
189. Jerry Seper, House Panel Invites Fiske to Testify, WASH. TIMs, June
28, 1994, at A3.
190. No Charges Against White House, Treasury Officials, Special Counsel
Fiske Reports, 63 BNA's BANKING REP. 53 (1994).
191. Susan Schmidt, Fiske Refocuses Whitewater Probe on Justice Dept. and
S&L Case; Special Counsel Says 2 Clinton Appointees Are 'Potentially Involved',
WASH. POST, July 9, 1994, at A3. Fiske did, however, offer to meet privately
with Gonzalez and the ranking Republican on the committee, Jim Leach, to
coordinate efforts between the two investigations. Gonzalez refused the offer.
Id.
192. Jack Nelson, Lawmaker Charges Fiske Is Aiding GOP on Whitewater,
L-A TIMEs, July 16, 1994, at A17.
460 [Vol. 80:407
1995] CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 461
Gonzalez was more than willing to grant Fiske's request,
perhaps because it gave him a non-partisan reason to squelch
charges against the President - charges that Gonzalez believed
to be both unfounded and politically motivated. If key witnesses
were off limits to the congressional investigators, Congress
would have to postpone its efforts. In the meantime, the public's
interest in the whole affair might fade away. And it might prove
difficult to ignite that interest again several months or years
later after the events had grown stale.193
But delay can serve more than one purpose. While Gonza-
lez hoped that delay would move the whole Whitewater question
off the political agenda permanently, Republicans after the No-
vember 1994 elections hoped that delay would shift Whitewater
off the crowded fall agenda of the new Congress, and into the
thick of the 1996 Presidential election campaign. Thus, Senator
D'Amato, who had pressed for immediate hearings in 1994, was
more willing in 1995 to defer to the request for more time from
Fiske's replacement, Kenneth Starr. 194
What is true for Whitewater holds true for any other con-
gressional investigation of high-level executive wrongdoing.
Some members of Congress will hope to push ahead with hear-
ings and the attendant political struggles. Several factors will
inspire them, not the least of which is the personal publicity
hearings on a timely subject can create. Concerns about costly
immunities will not create much hesitation. 9 5 Others in Con-
gress will want to delay the political struggle until a more ad-
vantageous moment - the "delay-to-win-later" camp. The delay
might move an investigation closer to a campaign season, or to a
time when the public seems more interested in the issue.1 96
193. Katy Harriger argues that the appointment of a special prosecutor or
independent counsel also serves the purpose of postponing or squelching media
and public interest in executive branch behavior. HARRIGER, supra note 171, at
68-98.
194. Kosova, supra note 8, at 12; Labaton, supra note 3, at A8 (reporting
that Sen. D'Amato denied political motivation for timing of hearings and
planned for the hearings to extend into the political season of 1996).
195. See DIVIDED WE GoVERN, supra note 112, at 8-33, 110-12, 138-39, 141-
42, 173-75 (discussing the political motivations for public hearings); see gener-
ally JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981) (giving
a theoretical overview of the legislative process linking all legislative choices to
re-election prospects).
196. For discussions of how the Watergate and Iran-Contra affairs initially
did not inspire much public interest (and therefore not much congressional in-
terest), see GLADYS ENGEL LANG & KURT LANG, TUE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPIN-
ION: PRESmENT, THE PRESS, AND THE POLLS DURING WATERGATE 44-61(1983)
(detailing the rise in public interest in Watergate); Scott Armstrong, Iran-Con-
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Still others will want to delay the struggle in hopes that it will
not reappear later - the "delay-to-forget" camp.
The delay-to-forget camp will have the strongest reasons to
keep immunities very costly, as they have been since the North
and Poindexter decisions. If a congressional decision to immu-
nize a witness makes a criminal prosecution virtually impossi-
ble, then any congressional use of immunities must wait until
the prosecutor's investigation and all the criminal proceedings
have ended. In the Iran-Contra affair, for instance, if Congress
had decided to avoid any risk of interference with the criminal
proceedings, it might have delayed any immunity grants until
August 1993 - seven years after the events in question took
place.197
The delay-to-win-later camp would rather have immunities
more readily available and less costly. When the time does fi-
nally arrive for the hearings and the political strife, they will
want access to as much testimony as possible. Hence, these
members of Congress will look for reasons to delay the start of
an investigation, but will ultimately need to think carefully
about granting immunities and to reduce immunity costs as
much as possible.
Prosecutorial investigators have provided this group with
enough reason to delay their hearings for the time being, even
when Congress has no plans to obtain any immunity orders for
witnesses. Prosecutors virtually always would prefer that con-
gressional investigators stay far removed from the case, whether
or not Congress grants immunities in the short run. Under the
right political conditions, these broader requests from prosecu-
tors for Congress to delay its investigations will find favor.' 98
tra: Was the Press any Match for All the President's Men?, 29 COLUM. JoURNAi-
ISM REv. 27-35 (May/June 1990) (describing the interest of the press at various
points during the Iran-Contra scandal).
197. 1 WALsH, supra note 120, at 51-53 (providing a concise chronology of
key events in the Iran-Contra affair, most of which occurred after 1986).
198. In the Whitewater investigations, Independent Counsel Starr's re-
quests for more time have given Representative Leach and Senator D'Amato
reason to conduct hearings that slowly address one phase of the matter at a
time, only moving to a new topic after Starr has completed his work on that
group of witnesses and documents. The initial Whitewater hearings in the Sen-
ate, before the August recess, covered the suicide of Vince Foster and the White
House handling of executive documents in his possession after the suicide.
Other aspects of Whitewater became the topic of Senate hearings after Labor
Day, 1995. Holly Idelson, Nussbaum Defends Actions After Foster's Death, 53
CONG. Q. WiuLY. Rpr. 2419, 2419 (1995). Initial hearings in the House Banking
and Financial Services Committee focused on the testimony of an investigator
for the Resolution Trust Corporation claiming that Clinton administration offi-
[Vol. 80:407462
19951 CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 463
There are several forms of short-term problems that a con-
gressional investigation might pose for a parallel criminal inves-
tigation, all unrelated to grants of immunity. If witnesses talk
first to congressional staff members and give their testimony in
congressional hearings, they will be less likely to give criminal
prosecutors the exact testimony they might hope to hear. Differ-
ent sets of investigators will interview and examine witnesses
with different priorities and abilities, so some may pursue a line
of questions more thoroughly than others. 199 Questioners also
may have different facts at their disposal, facts that are neces-
sary to jog the memory of the witness, or to prevent the witness
from subtly shading testimony in a particular direction.200
Unfortunately for criminal investigators who do not arrive
on the scene first, a witness who has already recounted events to
earlier congressional investigators will tend to "lock in" to the
earlier version of the story. This takes place in part for psycho-
logical reasons: the original retelling of the events becomes just
as real as the events themselves.201 It also takes place for legal
reasons: in extreme cases, a witness who gives inconsistent
statements might face charges of perjury.20 2 To the extent that
witnesses do elaborate on their earlier statements, they are
cials tried to obstruct her inquiry into loans made by a failed Arkansas savings
and loan and her attempts to make a criminal referral to the Department of
Justice. Taylor & Masci, supra note 2, at 2450. But see HABmGER, supra note
171, at 203-04 (explaining that because Congress chose to publicize its hear-
ings and immunize witnesses, this forced the special prosecutor in the Iran-
Contra case to "speed up his investigation").
199. HARRIGER, supra note 171, at 149 (quoting complaints of an independ-
ent prosecutor about the pitfalls of receiving a "chewed over" case). Ordinarily
one would expect professional prosecutors and investigators to have an advan-
tage in this setting over members of Congress and their staffs. Cf RoscoE
PoUND, CRn NAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 109, 186-87 (1930) (stating the grandjury has outlived its usefulness); W.F. WmLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICAL
ADmusTRTION 180-94 (1929) (preferring professional prosecutors over grand
juror control of criminal charges).
200. CAROL B. ANDERSON, NORTH CAROLINA TRIAL PRACTICE §§ 7-2 to 7-4
(forthcoming 1996). See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L.
REv. 277, 308-11 (1989) (explaining suggestive questioning may distort a wit-
ness's existing perceptions); Bart Schwartz, Interview with Louis Nizer, LITiG.,
Spring 1985, at 31-32 (emphasizing the importance of preparation to assemble
the facts necessary to trigger a witness's memory).
201. See Michael Owen Miller, Working with Memory, LrrIG., Summer 1993,
at 10, 12-13 (describing the memory process and three stages of memory); Rob-
ert Hanley, Working the Witness Puzzle, LrriG., Winter 1977, at 8 (asserting the
facts perceived by a witness are often transformed and supplemented).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (peijury). Witnesses who lie to congressional
investigators cannot, however, be prosecuted for false statements under 18
U.S.C. § 1001. Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1995).
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more susceptible to cross-examination later for inconsistent
statements.
Criminal investigators face additional obstacles if witnesses
testify publicly at a congressional hearing. The public airing of
the testimony, through the media and through published reports
at the close of congressional investigations, enables other wit-
nesses to listen to that testimony and to shift their own account
of the events in light of what they hear.2°3 It also creates oppor-
tunities for witnesses to tamper with documents and other phys-
ical evidence.
Thus, whenever a congressional investigation coincides
with a criminal investigation, the prosecutor will have a variety
of concerns, and a receptive congressional audience for each of
them. The delay-to-forget camp will be especially willing to
avoid any use of immunities, while the delay-to-win-later camp
will listen carefully to any requests from the prosecutor to have
the first access to witnesses.
Of course, the political costs of public hearings are not lim-
ited to one party. Most members of Congress, at one time or
another, will find themselves in the delay-to-forget camp and
will be grateful for the high costs of witness immunities. In this
complex political landscape, Congress's willingness to amend
statutes or its internal rules to reduce the cost of immunities, or
to deliberate more carefully about immunities, is in real doubt.
CONCLUSION: A NOTE ON THE VALUE OF
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
The North and Poindexter cases have highlighted for Con-
gress and the public the impact on criminal investigations when
Congress grants use immunity to a witness to compel testimony.
At this point, Congress appears more willing to choose criminal
prosecution than to pursue its own inquiries vigorously. Yet it is
too early to tell, even five years after the Iran-Contra cases,
whether Congress has abandoned the use of immunity grants
over the long run.
There are a few changes to the federal immunity statute,
internal rules of the Senate and House, and investigative prac-
tices that might make immunities less costly. None of these
changes, however, are likely to make a prosecutor's work much
easier if Congress decides to grant immunity to a potential de-
203. Robert Fiske cited this concern in his March 1994 letter to the Senate
and House Banking Committees. Fiske Letter, supra note 7, at 627.
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fendant. The changes either would run into conflict with cur-
rent Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, or they would lessen the
burden on the prosecution in too few cases.
This leaves Congress, for the foreseeable future, with a
choice between full-blown and timely congressional hearings, or
criminal charges. 20 That Congress has chosen criminal charges
so consistently over full congressional inquiry in recent years is
both revealing and troubling. This trend reveals just how heav-
ily our society depends on the criminal law, both to express dis-
approval and to change behavior. There are plenty of other
indicators of our heavy reliance on the criminal law.205 But a
congressional preference to preserve possible criminal charges
down the road, instead of pursuing immediate public hearings,
is one strong signal from the highest reaches of government
about the centrality of criminal law.
Preserving criminal prosecution may be the foremost con-
cern in some incidents of alleged wrongdoing. But when full and
immediate congressional investigation of matters of public im-
port, such as Whitewater or the FBI's conduct at Ruby Ridge,
are delayed or diminished out of deference to criminal investiga-
tion, then one must ask whether the public has been best served.
The choice of the criminal forum over the legislative forum in
such cases is troubling because of the cynicism about Congress
that the choice displays. It suggests that little worthwhile can
come of a congressional hearing, and that any prospect of a crim-
inal conviction should be enough reason to forego the pointless
spectacle of hearings. Whether or not this is a sound judgment,
it corrodes public faith to hear members of Congress themselves
declare this judgment.
Further, it is certainly worth asking whether a criminal
prosecution provides the appropriate sort of accountability for
misconduct in public office. If congressional hearings, rather
than a criminal proceeding, were to become the main event for
public scrutiny of a political figure, then political crimes would
204. See R.S. Ghio, The Iran-Contra Prosecutions and the Failure of Use Im-
munity, 45 STAN. L. REv. 229, 247-51 (1992) (arguing that congressional immu-
nity grants make later prosecutions virtually impossible and concluding that
Congress should not immunize witnesses who are likely to face criminal
prosecution).
205. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIIINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 247, 419 (1993) (showing increasing arrest rates per capita between
1971 and 1992, alongside declining crime rates); Janet Novack, How About a
Little Restructuring?, FORBES, Mar. 15, 1993, at 91 (noting the Department of
Justice's budget has more than quadrupled between 1980 and 1993 and its pay-
roll increased from 53,400 to almost 98,000).
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receive political punishments. And the decisionmakers - both
the members of Congress and the interested public - would be
better equipped to decide the issues than the often ill-informed
jurors who must decide criminal cases under current juror selec-
tion rules. 20 6
It is now unfashionable to praise congressional hearings.207
Yet there is a long history in this country of defending the vir-
tues of congressional investigations as a genuine forum for pub-
lic debate.208 As defenders have pointed out over the years,
206. Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND.
L.J. 1101, 1103 (1993) (referring to Mark Twain's description of the juror selec-
tion process as putting "a premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury");
Akhil R. Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 1169, 1180-81 n.22 (1995) (stating "intelligent and well-informed" jurors
are more likely dismissed).
207. This public perception about congressional hearings may have crystal-
lized in recent years during the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings, which
placed Senate investigators in a very unflattering light.
208. Attitudes towards congressional investigations have shifted through-
out this century. Up until the 1950s, liberal and progressive figures tended to
support broad investigative powers for Congress. See WOODROW WILSON, CON-
GRESSIONAL GOVERNmENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 303 (1885) (stating
congressional inquiry is necessary to fulfill the informing function of Congress);
Felix Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 21,
1924, at 329-31 (urging Congress's broad investigative powers be left untram-
meled); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional
Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153, 194-210 (1926) (arguing the inves-
tigative activities of Congress are necessary to carry-out the legislative function
and should not be limited). Investigations in the 1920s worked to hold executive
branch officials accountable (Teapot Dome, for instance) during a period of
growing delegation of authority. See EBERLING, supra note 26, at 280-81 (1928)
(describing congressional inquiry into executive performance as 'very success-
ful and most invaluable"). Investigations in the 1930s were designed to further
executive branch efforts to pass new legislation. M. NELSON McGEARY, THE DE-
VELOPMENTS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER 39-43 (1940) (recogniz-
ing the reinforcing role of investigations during the New Deal efforts to pass
legislation); Marshall Smelser, The Problem in Historical Perspective: The
Grand Inquest of the Nation, 1792-1948, 29 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 163, 179-80
(1954) (stating investigations in the 1930s aided the Roosevelt administration).
McCarthy-era abuses of congressional investigations provoked an outpouring of
new scholarship on the subject, much of it critical of Congress and distraught
over the lack of effective judicial supervision of congressional investigations.
See generally, BARTH, supra note 19, at 197-200 (criticizing the judicial branch
for being "slow in imposing any check upon the congressional investigating
power"); ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITI'EE ON UN-AMERICAN Acruvrrms
406-48 (1952) (examining the judiciariys reluctance to review and limit congres-
sional investigations); TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 240-62 (encouraging the de-
velopment of judicial review to limit investigations); Martha M. Driver,
Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish Contempts of Its
Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REV. 887, 888-911 (1952) (reviewing the
First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis of issues raised by investigations);
466
1995] CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY GRANTS 467
congressional hearings can achieve a wider range of objectives
than a judgment and sentence in a criminal case. Hearings will
sometimes result in genuine punishment for wrongdoers who
have not, strictly speaking, violated a criminal law.20 9 Hearings
can inform Congress about the need for new legislation.210 They
can also lead to public scrutiny of poor governance, and quicker
and more certain accountability of government officials-ac-
countability in a broader sense than the criminal law can
achieve.211
The costs of slow and incomplete congressional investiga-
tions are diffuse, but they have serious consequences for the
health of the republic. Obstacles to the use of immunity grants
do not, standing alone, cause ineffective congressional hearings.
But when Congress inquires into governmental conduct with
possible criminal ramifications, immunities are the central
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 416, 423-31 (1947) (desiring judicial action, although recogniz-
ing limitations on investigations require congressional self-restraint). When
Congress began in the 1960s and 1970s to use investigations again as a method
of highlighting perceived misconduct in the executive branch (especially with
regard to Watergate and various foreign policy questions), perception of the in-
vestigative power improved again. See DIVIDED WE GOVERN, supra note 112, at
165-68 (1991) (describing an anti-establishment mood and a more skeptical
Congress during the 1960s-70s).
209. Segal, supra note 167, at 952-54 (explaining that congressional investi-
gations may extend beyond inquiry into legally recognized crimes). Punish-
ment of witnesses, however, cannot be the only purpose of a hearing.
210. MARSHALL EDWARD DmociK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMIT-
TEES 72-84 (1929) (examining several cases in which Congress initiated fact-
finding investigations to perform its law-making function); George W. Van
Cleve & Charles Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret
International Enterprises in Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 55 Mo. L. Rav. 43, 92 (1990) (urging Congress to review the
problems encountered during the Iran-Contra hearings and amend "the laws so
the United States has power to detect and overcome" similar cases).
211. See McGEARY, supra note 208, at 23-49 (comparing congressional in-
vestigations to a board of directors in that it holds officials accountable for per-
formance of their duties); HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 121-207 (analyzing the
informative and investigatory functions of congressional inquiries); HARRIGER,
supra note 171, at 206-07 (discussing the drawbacks of an overly legalistic ap-
proach which focuses on narrow criminal prosecutions rather than investigat-
ing gray areas of "unethical but not criminal behavior"); TAYLOR, supra note 26,
at 58-70 (describing congressional investigations to expose economic and polit-
ical abuses); George B. Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 47, 48-49, 55 (1927) (exposing the wide range of governmen-
tal activities subjected to investigation by Congress). All of this would be even
more emphatically true if impeachment were to become a realistic possibility.
See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its Al-
ternatives, 68 Tjx. L. Rav. 1, 10-46 (1989) (tracing the problems associated with
current approaches to impeachment).
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source of conflict between congressional and criminal investiga-
tions. If Congress can improve its practices with immunities, it
will do more than improve its inner workings. It will reaffirm its
own legitimacy as a place for meaningful debate and accounta-
bility. It could foster, in a small way, the conditions for demo-
cratic debate and self-governance.
